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charge of that function. Such claims pervade American law and policy, but they are
rarely evaluated with rigor.
We take advantage of an unusual legislative experiment to conduct what we
believe to be the first systematic empirical analysis of the comparative institutional
competence of the executive and judicial branches in a critical field of American
law and policy: U.S. foreign relations. From 1952 to 1976, the U.S. State Department decided whether foreign nations would receive sovereign immunity from suits
in U.S. courts. Based on the perception that the State Department’s sovereign
immunity decisions were overly influenced by political considerations, Congress
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which transferred
immunity decisionmaking authority to the judiciary. This transfer was based on an
explicit comparative institutional competence claim: that courts are better equipped
than the State Department to make immunity decisions based on law rather than
politics.
To rigorously evaluate this fundamental claim, we created and analyzed an
extensive dataset of foreign sovereign immunity decisions made by the State
Department and the U.S. district courts over the last fifty years. Our principal
findings are threefold. First, we find little evidence that political factors systematically influenced the State Department’s immunity decisions. Second, there is strong
evidence that political factors have systematically influenced the courts’ decisions.
Third, the transfer of immunity decisionmaking authority to the courts did not
significantly affect the likelihood of immunity.
All three findings challenge both the underlying comparative institutional competence claims that supported the FSIA’s passage and more general conventional
understandings about the proper allocation of authority between the executive and
judicial branches. To be sure, there may be valid reasons for the judiciary to play a
leading role in immunity decisionmaking, and possibly other areas of U.S. foreign
relations as well. But our analysis casts doubt on the widely made comparative
institutional competence claim that the judicial branch is necessarily better equipped
than the executive branch to make foreign relations law decisions free from systematic
political influence.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges, legislators, and legal scholars often make “comparative institutional competence” claims—claims that one branch of government is better
at performing a specified function than another. Based on such claims, they
argue for legal rules delegating a function to a particular branch of government, or requiring one branch to defer to another when performing that
function.1
Comparative institutional competence claims pervade American law and
policy.2 For example, one of the Supreme Court’s rationales for its Chevron
doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes is that the
agencies charged with administering those statutes are better suited than
courts to interpret them.3 Whether a federal court will dismiss a suit based
on the political question doctrine in deference to a political branch of
government depends on whether there are “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving [the question]” and whether it is
possible to decide the question “without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”4 Comparative institutional competence claims are also at the center of debates over the appropriate role of the
judicial and executive branches in numerous other fields, such as counterterrorism,5 government mining of personal data,6 extradition,7 and human
rights.8

1 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 94950 (1989) (describing how comparative institutional competence arguments articulate a system
whereby “[t]he allocation of decisionmaking power and responsibility in government is built upon
a principle of comparative advantage, a principle built in turn on the assumption that certain
institutions are better suited than others to perform particular tasks”).
2 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994) (noting that “[e]mbedded in every law and public
policy analysis that ostensibly depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated,
that the goal in question is best carried out by a particular institution”); Rodriguez, supra note 1, at
949 (“The comparative institutional competence argument is a familiar one in public law
discourse.”).
3 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(explaining the advantages of agencies over courts); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding
Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and
Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 414 (arguing that the competence of agencies to
interpret statutes is so superior to that of courts that the Chevron doctrine should be applied even
more liberally than the Supreme Court itself has called for); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L. J. 1170, 1204-07 (2007) (arguing for extension of
Chevron deference to executive interpretation of foreign relations law).
4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
5 See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 893
(2012) (critiquing “claims of comparative institutional competence lodged on behalf of the
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As these examples suggest, comparative institutional competence claims
are important.9 Lawmaking and policymaking depend not only on setting
social goals, but also on deciding who has the authority to determine how to
pursue those goals.10 Because one institution may be better able to implement those goals than another, the impact of a legal rule or policy depends
on which institution has that authority.11 As Neil Komesar concludes in his
landmark book on the subject, “institutional choice is an essential part of
law and public policy choice, and, therefore, comparative institutional
analysis is an essential part of any analysis of law and public policy.”12
“[D]eciding who decides” matters.13 But that crucial institutional choice can
only be as sound as the comparative institutional competence claims upon
which it is based.
Unfortunately, comparative institutional competence claims are rarely
evaluated rigorously.14 As Komesar laments, too often competence claims in
favor of particular institutions are simply treated as “intuitively obvious,”
dealt with “as an afterthought,” or defended with a recitation of “a long
parade of horribles” that would result from an allocation of authority to a

executive or Congress” in counterterrorism cases and arguments for judicial deference to the
political branches based on such claims).
6 See Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343,
347-53 (2008) (arguing against judicial deference to the executive branch regarding data mining
programs as an “abdication of their function . . . to [determine] whether [a government security
measure] passes constitutional muster”).
7 See John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 2004 (2010) (assessing the claim that judges are less competent than
executive branch officials to determine extradition matters).
8 See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117,
1139 (2011) (summarizing comparative institutional claims used to argue for judicial deference to
the executive branch in human rights litigation).
9 See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasizing “the importance of institutional choice and
comparative institutional analysis”).
10 See id. at 5 (“Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public
policy. They are inextricably related. On the one hand, institutional performance and, therefore,
institutional choice cannot be assessed except against the bench mark of some social goal or set of
goals. On the other, because in the abstract any goal can be consistent with a wide range of public
policies, the decision as to who decides determines how a goal shapes public policy. It is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal or public policy results.”).
11 See id. (“Embedded in every law and public policy analysis that ostensibly depends solely
on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated, that the goal in question is best carried out by
a particular institution.”).
12 Id. at 3-4.
13 Id. at 3.
14 See id. at 4 (“Although important and controversial decisions about who decides are buried
in every law and public policy issue, they often go unexamined, are treated superficially, or, at best,
are analyzed in terms of the characteristics of one alternative.”).
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rival institution.15 Contributing to this problem is a lack of systematic
empirical analysis of comparative institutional competence claims.16 As
William Eskridge notes,
most of the generalizations needed to advance a comparative institutional
analysis rest upon factual beliefs that are not supported by empirical data or
even a representative array of case studies . . . . [P]recious little empirical
work [has] even been attempted . . . . [I]t is disturbing that comparative
institutional analysis of public law often rests upon confident, even dogmatic,
factual assertions that are completely unsupported.17

Foreign relations law is one area where comparative institutional competence claims are frequently made with little empirical evidence. At the most
general level, scholars and policymakers are debating whether the executive
branch is better equipped to make foreign relations law decisions because of
its superior ability to weigh political considerations, or whether these
determinations should be left to the courts because they are insulated from
political pressures. In these debates, arguments for judicial deference to the
executive branch in foreign relations are both defended18 and criticized19

15
16

Id. at 5-6.
See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 414 (noting “the dearth of solid empirical work” on comparative institutional analysis).
17 Id.; see also KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 6 (“In a world of institutional alternatives that are
both complex and imperfect, institutional choice by implication, simple intuition, or even long
lists of imperfections is deeply inadequate. These approaches do not take institutional choice or
analysis seriously.”).
18 See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 507, 539-44 (2011) (criticizing judicial involvement in foreign affairs based on comparative
institutional competence claims); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 181 (arguing that “as a matter
of institutional competence, the federal judiciary suffers significant disadvantages [in a foreign
affairs role] compared to the executive branch”); Margaret A. Niles, Judicial Balancing of Foreign
Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327, 344
(1983) (arguing on comparative institutional competence grounds that “the judiciary is the least
appropriate branch of the federal government to be making decisions concerning foreign affairs”);
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1202 (arguing for judicial deference because the executive
branch is more institutionally competent than the judicial branch in matters involving foreign
policy).
19 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 46-60 (1992) (critiquing arguments against judicial
involvement in matters touching on foreign affairs based on comparative competence claims);
Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 805, 807-12 (1989)
(using comparative institutional competence claims to critique arguments for judicial deference to
the executive branch in foreign policy cases); Parry, supra note 7, at 2004 (using comparative
institutional competence arguments to critique calls for judicial deference to the executive branch
in extradition cases); Solove, supra note 6, at 349-50 (using comparative institutional competence
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based on claims about the competence of the courts and the executive
branch. But these debates have unfolded based almost exclusively on
anecdotes and untested assumptions.20
The debate over comparative institutional competence in foreign relations law has not been confined to academia, but frequently plays out in the
courts as well. For example, when the Supreme Court established the act of
state doctrine—which bars courts from questioning the validity of public
acts of foreign sovereigns within their borders—in the landmark case Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the decision directly hinged on the “competency of dissimilar institutions [i.e., the executive and the judiciary] to make
and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations.”21 More recently, since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in
Samantar v. Yousuf, 22 the lower courts have been grappling with whether the
executive or judicial branch should determine whether individuals should be
given immunity from suit because they were acting as foreign government
officials. The U.S. government argues that the courts should give it absolute
deference on foreign official immunity matters,23 while others argue that the
courts should decide these matters.24 Both the academic debate and judicial
decisions have been hampered, however, by the lack of rigorous, empirical
evidence about whether there are systematic differences in the way that the
executive and judicial branches make decisions about foreign relations law.
In this Article, we begin tackling this problem. We take advantage of an
unusual historical occurrence—a legislative experiment, whereby a specific
governmental function was transferred from one branch of government to
another—to undertake a systematic empirical analysis of the comparative
institutional competencies of the executive and judicial branches to make
foreign relations law decisions.
The function we investigate is foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking.
According to the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, a foreign state is
immune from suit in a U.S. court unless an exception to immunity

arguments to critique calls for judicial deference to the executive branch regarding government
programs to mine private data).
20 See Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 181 (noting that the institutional assessments are based on
“generalizations and assumptions”).
21 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
22 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286-89 (2010).
23 See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he United
States, participating as amicus curiae, takes the position that federal courts owe absolute deference
to the State Department's view of whether a foreign official is entitled to sovereign immunity”).
24 See generally Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case
Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2011).
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applies.25 Foreign sovereign immunity is a core doctrine of U.S. foreign
relations law,26 implementing a fundamental principle of international law:
one nation ordinarily cannot be sued in another nation’s courts.27 The
doctrine is important both formally, as an expression of the independence
and legal equality of sovereign states,28 and practically, as a way of fostering
friendly international relations.29 For many years, the U.S. State Department was responsible for deciding whether foreign states would enjoy
immunity in particular lawsuits.30 However, legal scholars and lawyers—
including lawyers from the State Department itself—argued that the State
Department’s immunity decisions were overly influenced by political factors
and insufficiently based on the law of sovereign immunity.31 In response to
these concerns, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA),32 which transferred the foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function to the judiciary.33
This transfer of authority was based on an explicit comparative institutional competence claim: that the courts would be better than the State
Department at making immunity decisions based on law rather than
25 In the context of foreign sovereign immunity, the term “state” has its international legal
meaning—that is, it refers to a “country” such as the United States or Kenya rather than a U.S.
state such as California or Utah. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”).
26 See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
ch. 2 (2008) (providing an overview of foreign sovereign immunity).
27 See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
G.A. Res. 59/38, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter UN Convention] (“A
State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of
another State subject to the provisions of the present Convention.”).
28 See HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 57 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that foreign
sovereign immunity is based on “the maxim par in parem non habet imperium: one sovereign State is
not subject to the jurisdiction of another State”).
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
ch. 5, introductory note at 391 (1987) ( justifying foreign sovereign immunity as “necessary for the
effective conduct of international intercourse and the maintenance of friendly relations”). For a
more detailed discussion of the formal and functional bases of the foreign sovereign immunity
doctrine, see generally Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court
Access, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2033 (2013).
30 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 231-33
(2013) (describing the State Department’s approach to immunity during this period).
31 See infra Section I.C.
32 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–
1611 (2012)).
33 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012) (“Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be
decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth
in this chapter.”).
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politics.34 Because the validity of this claim could not be established ex ante,
the FSIA’s transfer of foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking from the
executive branch to the judicial branch represents an experiment in comparative institutional competence. Since the passage of the FSIA, experts have
argued that the transfer did indeed substantially depoliticize foreign
sovereign immunity decisionmaking.35 But these ex post assessments have
yet to be empirically scrutinized.
By statistically analyzing newly collected data on executive branch and
judicial branch performance of foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking,
we evaluate the FSIA’s experiment in comparative institutional competence.
We find little evidence that political factors were systematically related to
the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity decisions.36 And,
contrary to the FSIA’s underlying comparative institutional competence
claim and ex post assessments of that claim, we find significant evidence
that political factors are related to the judiciary’s immunity decisions.37
Moreover, although the transfer of foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking was partly intended to facilitate court access for suits against
foreign states,38 we find that even after controlling for a variety of casespecific legal and political factors, the courts are as likely as the State
Department was to grant immunity.39
We present our analysis in four main parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine and its relationship to
institutional choice, and by analyzing the FSIA’s legislative history to
34 See JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES,
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) (“A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the
foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often
crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds.”); see also infra Section I.C.
35 See FRANCK, supra note 19, at 105 (arguing that the FSIA “succeed[ed] in largely depoliticizing the issue of foreign sovereign immunity”); Wuerth, supra note 24, at 952 (noting problems
associated with the State Department having immunity decisionmaking authority and concluding
that “[r]eturning immunity to the courts resolved these problems”).
36 See infra Section III.A.
37 See infra Section III.B.
38 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 23 (1976) (noting that some procedural provisions of FSIA
were intended to “insure that private persons have adequate means for commencing a suit against
a foreign state to seek redress in the courts”); see also Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 24, 29 (1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State) [hereinafter Leigh Testimony] (noting that the FSIA’s general
purpose is “[t]o assure that American citizens are not deprived of normal legal redress against
foreign states who engage in ordinary commercial transactions” and “to facilitate . . . litigation
against foreign states”).
39 See infra Section III.C.
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uncover the comparative institutional competence claim that provided the
rationale for the FSIA’s transfer of the foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function from the executive branch to the judicial branch. In
short, the FSIA promised to depoliticize foreign sovereign immunity
decisionmaking by transferring the function to a supposedly more competent institution—the judicial branch. The FSIA’s legislative history also
indicates that another purpose for the transfer was to enhance court access
for litigants in claims against foreign sovereigns.
Part II presents our empirical methodology. We began by creating a
foreign sovereign immunity dataset (FSI Dataset) containing detailed
information about all 118 available foreign sovereign immunity decisions
by the State Department between 1952 and 1976 and approximately 380
foreign sovereign immunity decisions by U.S. district courts since 1976.
We then assembled extensive additional data on a wide range of legal and
political factors that potentially influence foreign sovereign immunity
decisionmaking, and incorporated that data into the FSI Dataset. Finally,
we used statistical methods to analyze the dataset. We used these techniques
to test for legal and political factors that predict the State Department’s and
U.S. district courts’ foreign sovereign immunity decisions, and to determine
whether the likelihood of a grant of immunity is related in a statistically
significant way to which institution has decisionmaking authority.
Part III presents our results. While we explore many nuances in the
pages that follow, our principal findings are threefold. First, we find little
evidence that political factors were systematically related to the State
Department’s immunity decisions. Of course, political factors may have
played an important role in some individual cases. But our results suggest
that the State Department was more competent as a foreign sovereign
immunity decisionmaker than was widely believed at the time of the FSIA’s
adoption.
Second, we find evidence that political factors—including the foreign
state’s economic strength, the nature of the foreign state’s political system,
and the judge’s political ideology—are systematically related to the judiciary’s foreign sovereign immunity decisions. All else being equal, the courts
appear more likely to grant immunity to wealthy, democratic allies than to
other nations; conservative judges appear less likely to grant immunity than
liberal judges; and judges appear more likely to grant immunity when there
is a U.S. plaintiff than when there is not. On the other hand, there is
evidence that legal factors have an influence, too. In particular, two legal
factors—commercial activity and U.S. contacts—affect the courts’ foreign
sovereign immunity decisions in commercial activity exception cases. More
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subtly, it also appears that ideological influences are more subdued in areas
where the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine is better developed, which is
consistent with prior findings that doctrinal clarity can constrain judicial
discretion.
Third, it does not appear that it has been any easier for plaintiffs to gain
court access in suits against foreign sovereigns since the FSIA’s transfer of
immunity decisionmaking from the State Department to the courts.
Overall, our findings suggest that the FSIA’s experiment in institutional
choice may not have been as successful—and perhaps may not have been as
necessary—as is almost uniformly assumed. Contrary to the FSIA’s comparative institutional competence rationale, the State Department’s decisions
do not appear to have been systematically politicized, yet there do appear to
be systematic political influences on the district courts’ decisions.
Part IV explores the broader implications of our analysis. Beyond our specific findings regarding foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking by the
State Department and the district courts, our analysis informs intensifying
post-Samantar debates over the appropriate roles for the executive branch
and the judicial branch in foreign official immunity decisionmaking. The
analysis sheds much needed empirical light on more general debates about
comparative institutional competence in foreign relations law, reinforces
prior research on the relationship between doctrinal clarity and judicial
impartiality, and illustrates a methodological approach that can be used for
evaluating comparative institutional competence claims in ways that move
beyond mere theory and anecdotal evidence.
As two prominent foreign relations law scholars acknowledge in the context
of their own comparative institutional competence claims in favor of the
executive branch, those claims necessarily rely “on certain generalizations
and assumptions about how these institutions work because it is difficult to
imagine a sufficiently rigorous empirical test of these functional claims.”40
We do not claim to have a perfect empirical solution; but given the dearth
of empirical analysis of comparative institutional competence claims—in
foreign relations law or otherwise—we think our analysis is a step forward.
And while generalizations from our specific findings should be made with
caution, our analysis suggests that, even if the judiciary may have institutional advantages over the executive branch, it is not clear that these
advantages include the ability to depoliticize matters that touch on foreign
affairs or that the executive branch is unable to make sound legal decisions.

40

Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 181.
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I. THE FSIA’S COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE CLAIMS
The State Department was widely criticized for making foreign sovereign immunity decisions that were excessively influenced by political
considerations and insufficiently based on the law of foreign sovereign
immunity. One of the primary purposes of the FSIA was to depoliticize
foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking. To accomplish this, the FSIA
transferred the foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function from
the State Department to the courts. Underlying this institutional solution to
the problem of politicization was a particular comparative institutional
competence claim: that the courts would be better able than the State
Department to make decisions based on law without being influenced by
political concerns. With the passage of time, this claim can now be evaluated. In this Part, we set the stage for our empirical assessment of the FSIA’s
underlying comparative institutional competence claims by explaining the
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine and its relationship to institutional
choice, and analyzing the FSIA’s legislative history to uncover the comparative institutional competence claims that provided the principal rationale for
transferring the foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function from
the executive to the judiciary.
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Institutional Choice
Under the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, “states”—sovereign
nations and their governmental organs and instrumentalities41—generally
are immune from suit in the courts of other states.42 When the doctrine
emerged in the nineteenth century, the so-called “absolute theory” of
foreign sovereign immunity prevailed, according to which immunity was
essentially unconditional.43 But by the mid-twentieth century, a “restrictive

41
42

See supra note 25 and accompanying text (defining “state”).
See UN Convention, supra note 27, at art. 5 (“A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself
and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions of
the present Convention.”). Foreign sovereign immunity is the immunity of a State as a distinct
entity, and is different from head-of-state immunity, diplomatic immunity, consular immunity, and
foreign official immunity. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295-304
(2d ed. 2012) (distinguishing these different types of immunity). This Article addresses only
foreign sovereign immunity.
43 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. 5, introductory note at 391 (1987) (“Until the twentieth century, sovereign immunity
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts seemed [to] have no exceptions.”). However, some scholars
argue that the absolute theory never reflected actual practice. See, e.g., GAMAL MOURSI BADR,
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theory” of immunity had developed.44 According to the restrictive theory, a
state is immune against claims arising out of its public or sovereign acts
( jure imperii), but not its private or commercial acts ( jure gestionis).45 Today,
the restrictive approach predominates,46 and a variety of exceptions to
immunity—most prominently, the restrictive approach’s commercial activity
exception—are widely recognized.47 Thus, unless an exception to immunity
applies, the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine requires a state to refrain
from exercising jurisdiction in a suit before its courts against another state.
Foreign sovereign immunity is a doctrine of customary international
law.48 However, because it is a doctrine of immunity from suit in domestic
courts, it depends on domestic implementation.49 In fact, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1812 decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon50 is widely cited
as the seminal statement and application of the doctrine.51 If one state
allows a suit in its courts to proceed against another state in the absence of
an applicable exception from immunity, the defendant state may attempt to
pursue an international legal claim against the forum state for violation of

STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 18-19 (1984) (challenging the
existence of the absolute theory of state immunity).
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
ch. 5, introductory note at 391 (“The restrictive principle of immunity spread rapidly after the
Second World War.”).
45 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327-28 (7th ed. 2008)
(explaining that the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine distinguishes “between acts of
government, jure imperii, and acts of a commercial nature, jure gestionis, denying immunity from
jurisdiction in the latter case”).
46 See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 707 (6th ed. 2008) (noting that “[t]he
majority of states now have tended to accept the restrictive immunity doctrine”).
47 See, e.g., UN Convention, supra note 27, at arts. 7 (express consent of State), 9 (counterclaims against State), 10 (commercial activity), 13 (suits involving property in the forum State), 17
(suits involving arbitration agreements or awards).
48 See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 109, at 342-43 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (noting that foreign sovereign immunity is a rule of customary international law); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), 2012
I.C.J. 1031, ¶¶ 27-29, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf (confirming customary
international law status of foreign sovereign immunity doctrine).
49 See UN Convention, supra note 27, at art. 6(1) (“A State shall give effect to State immunity
under article 5 by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its courts against
another State and to that end shall ensure that its courts determine on their own initiative that the
immunity of that other State . . . is respected.”).
50 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
51 See Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 167 RECUEIL DES
COURS 113, 122 (1980) (“Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon is regularly
cited as the first judicial expression of the doctrine of absolute immunity.” (footnote omitted)).
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the international legal principle of foreign sovereign immunity.52 But the
day-to-day implementation of the doctrine occurs domestically in the states
where other states are sued.
This raises a fundamental institutional question: which institution of a
state’s government should be in charge of implementing the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine? That is, which branch should examine particular
cases to determine whether the general rule of immunity applies (requiring
dismissal of the suit) or whether an exception to immunity applies (allowing
the suit to proceed)? In the United States, the answer to this question has
changed over time.53 In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century,
both the executive branch and the courts played a role in foreign sovereign
immunity decisionmaking.54 During this period, “although courts gave some
weight to the executive branch’s views about whether to grant sovereign
immunity, the courts ultimately made their own determinations.”55
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the State Department
Later in the twentieth century, the State Department took the lead in
foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking. In the 1930s, the courts
increasingly deferred to the State Department’s immunity determinations.56
In its 1943 decision in Ex parte Republic of Peru, the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly held that the judicial branch was bound to follow the executive
branch’s suggestions of immunity.57 Additionally, in its 1945 decision in
52 See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), 2012 I.C.J.
1031 , ¶ 107 (ruling that Italy violated the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity by allowing a suit
to proceed in its courts against Germany).
53 In other countries, the courts generally have been responsible for foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) (noting that “in virtually every
other country . . . sovereign immunity decisions are made exclusively by the courts and not by a
foreign affairs agency”).
54 For a detailed discussion of foreign sovereign immunity in the nineteenth and early twentieth century courts, see G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 27-28, 134-37 (1999).
55 BRADLEY, supra note 30, at 229.
56 Id. at 230 (“[C]ourts . . . began giving absolute deference to suggestions from the State
Department.”). Yet “[i]t is not entirely clear why the Court shifted toward giving absolute
deference to the executive branch.” Id. Bradley speculates that this shift may be related to a more
general shift toward expanded presidential power “due in part to the broader role of the United
States in the world and the advent of the Second World War.” Id.
57 318 U.S. 578 (1943). The Court recognized that

courts are required to accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel is
immune. . . . The Department has allowed the claim of immunity and caused its
action to be certified to the district court through the appropriate channels. The
certification and the request that the vessel be declared immune must be accepted
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Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule of
deference and further held that, in the absence of State Department guidance in specific cases, the courts must still follow principles of immunity
accepted by the State Department—even if those principles diverge from
customary international law principles of immunity as discerned by the
courts.58
Meanwhile, the State Department refined its approach to foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the State Department officially adopted the “restrictive theory”
of sovereign immunity in a 1952 letter to the Acting Attorney General from
the Acting Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, Jack Tate (the
“Tate Letter”).59 According to the restrictive theory, “the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts ( jure imperii)
of a state, but not with respect to private acts ( jure gestionis).”60 In other
words, states should enjoy immunity from suits arising out of the exercise of
their governmental functions, but not from suits arising out of the types of
activities in which private parties engage.
Procedurally, the State Department increasingly formalized its process
for foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking. It began by requiring a
formal diplomatic request from the embassy of the foreign state seeking
immunity.61 The Department based its immunity decisions “on either

by the courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government
that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our
foreign relations.
Id. at 588-89 (citation omitted).
58 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945) (holding that courts should look to “the principles accepted by
the [executive branch]” and that “[i]t is . . . not for the courts to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government
has not seen fit to recognize”); see also BRADLEY, supra note 30, at 230 (explaining that the Court
in Hoffman went further than it did in Ex parte Republic of Peru by holding that “even in the face of
executive branch silence, U.S. courts should look to ‘the principles accepted by the [executive
branch]’” (quoting Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35)); White, supra note 55, at 143 (noting that “Mexico v.
Hoffman made it clear that the Executive’s position on an immunity prevailed even when it
diverged from customary international law”).
59 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter], in 26 DEP’T
ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952) (“[I]t will hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant
of sovereign immunity.”).
60 Tate Letter, supra note 59, at 984.
61 See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 1952 TO
JANUARY 1977, 1977 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT’L L. 1017, 1019 (Michael Sandler, Detlev F. Vagts &
Bruno A. Ristau eds., 1977) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT] (tracing the origins of
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representations of the embassy concerned, copies of pleadings filed with the
court, or reports from the Department of Justice.”62 By the late 1960s, the
Department introduced opportunities for both litigants to submit written
memoranda supporting their positions, and also to make oral presentations
on the immunity issue, albeit “as informal conferences and not as on-therecord administrative proceedings.”63 If the State Department then decided
that immunity should be granted, it would ask the Justice Department to
file a “suggestion of immunity” with the court.64
Despite these refinements, the State Department’s performance of the
foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function presented two serious
concerns. First, the State Department itself complained that being in charge
of that function created foreign relations problems. For example, foreign
states sued in U.S. courts exerted pressure on the State Department to
suggest immunity, while denials of immunity sometimes resulted in negative diplomatic repercussions.65 As one State Department Legal Adviser
explained,
State Department involvement [in foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking] can be detrimental because some foreign states may be led to
believe that since the decision can be made by the executive branch it
should be strongly affected by foreign policy considerations. Consequently,
foreign states are sometimes inclined to regard a decision by the State
Department refusing to suggest immunity as a political decision unfavorable to them rather than a legal decision.66

the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity beginning with the Tate Letter and evolving into the
FSIA).
62 Id. at 1019.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1022.
65 See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 60
(1976) (testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, Cochairman, Committee on Transnatonal Judicial Procedure,
American Bar Association, International Law Section) [hereinafter Trooboff Testimony] (“[T]he
[State] Department becomes embroiled in a pending case when another sovereign state chooses to
thrust the issue upon the Department by requesting a suggestion of immunity. The Department
then finds itself with a political problem that it did not create and which, more [often] than not, it
may not need or want.”).
66 Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 14 (1973) (statement of Charles N.
Brower, Legal Adviser, Department of State) [hereinafter Brower Statement].
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Second, State Department immunity decisionmaking was perceived to
be politicized and inconsistent.67 As noted at the hearings on the FSIA, the
State Department sometimes “granted immunity in cases involving unquestionably commercial transactions [for which immunity should have been
denied].”68 It was also noted that
[t]here is always the risk, which is an unfair one for private litigants to run,
that the Department will reach a decision to suggest immunity in order to
achieve some foreign policy objective during what might be a period of
delicate diplomatic negotiations with that particular foreign government.69

One study published shortly before the FSIA’s adoption noted the probability that “diplomatic and political considerations were deemed to be of
overriding importance,”70 which the executive branch conceded to be a
problem.71 Simply put, the concern was that immunity decisions—and, from
a claimant’s perspective, court access decisions—were being decided based
on political, rather than legal considerations.72

67 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976) (“The foreign state . . . decides when it will attempt
to exert diplomatic influences, thereby making it more difficult for the State Department to apply
the Tate letter criteria. From the standpoint of the private litigant, considerable uncertainty
results. A private party who deals with a foreign government entity cannot be certain that his legal
dispute with a foreign state will not be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations through the
foreign government’s intercession with the Department of State.”); Monroe Leigh, Sovereign
Immunity—The Case of the “Imias,” 68 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1974) (noting that “lively criticism
of the State Department [is] less concerned with a consistent application of international law than
with whatever short term diplomatic objectives seemed appropriate at the moment”).
68 Trooboff Testimony, supra note 65, at 60 (explaining this inconsistency within the State
Department’s decisions).
69 Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 95
(1976) (testimony of Michael Marks Cohen, Chairman of the Committee on Maritime Legislation
of the Maritime Law Association of the United States) [hereinafter Cohen Testimony].
70 Leigh, supra note 67, at 288.
71 See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 35 (1976) (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division,
Department of Justice) [hereinafter Ristau Testimony] (testifying that “in practice I would have to
say to you in candor that the State Department, being a political institution, has not always been
able to resist [diplomatic] pressures” in immunity decisionmaking).
72 Of course, it is worth noting that it is possible that these publicly stated concerns were not
the true motivations of the actors lobbying for the passage of the FSIA. Instead, self-serving interest
groups may have been publicizing these concerns as cover for their own agendas. For example, it may
have been the case that members of the private bar were tired of losing, or that members of the State
Department simply wanted to eliminate the paperwork. That said, the rationales that we have laid out
were not only presented by actors at the time, but have since been consistently offered by legal
scholars studying the subject. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 19, at 104-05 (describing the concerns
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C. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Courts
It was against this background that Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976.73
Legally, the FSIA codified the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity adopted in the Tate Letter, including an exception for certain
suits based upon the commercial activity of a foreign state.74 In terms of
institutional choice, the FSIA transferred the foreign sovereign immunity
decisionmaking function away from the State Department and vested it
exclusively in the courts. Under the FSIA, “[c]laims of foreign states to
immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and
of the States.”75
By transferring the immunity decisionmaking function to the courts, the
FSIA promised to rectify the problem of politicization of immunity decisions.76 As the House Report on the FSIA put it,
[a] principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign
immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing
the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring
litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds
and under procedures that insure due process.77

This rationale for the transfer is made clear in the FSIA’s legislative history. As stated in Department of Justice testimony in support of the FSIA,
“the bill is designed to depoliticize the area of sovereign immunity by
placing the responsibility for determining questions of immunity in the
courts.”78 According to State Department testimony, transferring the

relating to the State Department that led to the FSIA’s enactment); Wuerth, supra note 24, at 952
(explaining the policy reasons for passing the FSIA).
73 Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1602, 90 Stat. 2891, 2892 (1976).
74 These exceptions are codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1605A, and 1607 (2012).
75 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012); see also Leigh Testimony, supra note 38, at 25 (emphasizing that
the bill would “vest sovereign immunity decisions exclusively in the courts”); H.R. REP. NO. 941487, at 12 (1976) (stating that the FSIA is designed to “leav[e] sovereign immunity decisions
exclusively to the courts, thereby discontinuing the practice of judicial deference to ‘suggestions of
immunity’ from the executive branch”).
76 See Brower Statement, supra note 66, at 14 (“We at the Department of State are now persuaded . . . that the foreign relations interests of the United States as well as the rights of litigants
would be better served if these questions of law and fact were decided by the courts rather than by
the executive branch.”).
77 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
78 Ristau Testimony, supra note 71, at 31.
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foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function to the courts would
“insure that sovereign immunity questions are decided on legal grounds.”79
The private bar’s support for the FSIA was based largely on the promise
of depoliticizing immunity decisionmaking by transferring the function to
the courts. As one prominent practitioner testified, “[t]he net effect of this
bill will be to depoliticize the treatment of legal questions that properly
belong exclusively in a judicial forum.”80 According to another, the transfer
to the courts would ensure that litigants “would be able to rely upon the
resolution of immunity questions in commercial cases by courts free from
diplomatic or political influence.”81
The State Department, on the other hand, was said to be institutionally
ill-suited to make immunity decisions based on legal rather than political
considerations. According to the House Report, the State Department was
“in the awkward position of a political institution trying to apply a legal
standard to litigation already before the courts. Moreover, it does not have
the machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate
review.”82 As Monroe Leigh wrote shortly before becoming the Legal
Adviser to the State Department, “there is [a] fundamental question
whether it is reasonable to expect the Executive Branch to exercise the
juridical function of applying the law of sovereign immunity free from the
distorting effect of political considerations.”83 The House Report asserted

79 Brower Statement, supra note 66, at 15; see also Leigh Testimony, supra note 38, at 29
(“[T]he broad purposes of the bill are ‘to facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states
and to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising out of such litigation.’”).
80 Trooboff Testimony, supra note 65, at 60.
81 Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 80
(1976) (testimony of Cecil J. Olmstead, Chairman, The Rule of Law Committee, Vice President,
Texaco Co.); see also id. at 88 (statement of the International Law and Transactions Division of the
District of Columbia Bar) (“Elimination of the Department’s role . . . will be fairer to litigants and
will result in a more coherent and predictable body of doctrine.”); id. at 72 (statement of the
Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (“By
removing the question of sovereign immunity from the political sphere and placing it with the
courts, where it belongs, the State Department is relieved of a burden it is ill equipped to bear and
provides the private litigant with assurance that his claim will be determined under comprehensive
rules and before a tribunal not subject to the daily exigencies of foreign policy.”).
82 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976).
83 Leigh, supra note 67, at 285; see also Leigh Testimony, supra note 38, at 25 (noting “outdated
practice of having a political institution, namely the State Department, decide many of these
questions of law”); Trooboff Testimony, supra note 65, at 58 (“As a political and policymaking
agency, the Department of State is an inappropriate forum for dispassionate determination of the
commercial/noncommercial question and related issues. Moreover, . . . it is ill-equipped to
perform that judicial function.”); Philip C. Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its
Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 168, 169 (1946) (“[T]his is a most unsatisfactory role for the
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that transferring the authority to make these decisions to the courts would
“assur[e] litigants that [they] are made on purely legal grounds.”84 Testimony in support of the FSIA emphasized the importance of immunity decisionmaking of “impartial and disinterested character” and argued that this
“can only be assured by open judicial determination of that issue.”85
A second, less explicitly articulated, comparative institutional competence claim underlying the passage of the FSIA was that transferring
immunity decisionmaking authority to the judiciary would increase access
to U.S. courts for private litigants in suits against foreign sovereigns. The
House Report noted that provisions of the FSIA would “insure that private
persons have adequate means for commencing a suit against a foreign state
to seek redress in the courts.”86 Similarly, State Department Legal Adviser
Monroe Leigh testified that one purpose of the FSIA is “[t]o assure that
American citizens are not deprived of normal legal redress against foreign
states who engage in ordinary commercial transactions” and “to facilitate . . . litigation against foreign states.”87
In summary, the FSIA’s proposed solution to the problem of the politicization of immunity decisionmaking was based on a fundamental—yet
untested—comparative institutional competence claim: the courts are better
equipped to make foreign sovereign immunity decisions than the State
Department, and, in particular, better equipped to ground their decisions in
legal, rather than political, considerations. The House Report makes this
claim explicitly, stating that the FSIA’s “central premise” is that “decisions
on claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by the
judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards
recognized under international law.”88 A second underlying claim was that
transferring immunity decisionmaking authority to the judiciary would
facilitate suits against foreign sovereigns.
II. EVALUATING THE CLAIMS: AN EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
It has now been almost forty years since the adoption of the FSIA and
its transfer of the foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking function
from the State Department to the judiciary. Thus, it is now possible to
Department of State to discharge. It is not organized in such a way as to facilitate its rendering
what are essentially judicial decisions.”).
84 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
85 Cohen Testimony, supra note 69, at 94.
86 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487at 23.
87 Leigh Testimony, supra note 38, at 24, 29 (quotation marks omitted).
88 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14 (emphasis added).
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evaluate the FSIA’s underlying comparative institutional competence
claims. Are the courts better able than the State Department to make
decisions based on law without being influenced by political factors? Were
the State Department’s decisions influenced by political rather than legal
factors, as assumed in the FSIA’s legislative history? After the FSIA, have
the courts based their decisions on legal rather than political considerations,
as the FSIA promised? Are there other systematic differences between
immunity decisionmaking in the State Department and in the courts? In
particular, do litigants have improved opportunities to pursue claims against
foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts? The answers to these questions are
relevant to analyzing the FSIA and, more broadly, provide insights about
the appropriate roles of the executive and judicial branches in foreign
relations.
In this Part, we present our empirical strategy for shedding light on these
questions. As explained in detail below, we began by identifying hundreds of
foreign sovereign immunity decisions made by the State Department before
the FSIA was passed, and subsequently by the U.S. district courts after the
enactment of the FSIA. We then carefully analyzed each decision and coded
it to indicate whether or not it resulted in a grant of immunity. We also
coded these decisions using data to measure a wide range of legal and
political factors that potentially influenced them.
The result was an extensive dataset of foreign sovereign immunity decisions—the FSI Dataset. Using statistical methods, we then used the FSI
Dataset to evaluate the FSIA’s underlying comparative institutional competence claims. This strategy cannot uncover all differences between the two
institutions’ immunity decisions, but it does allow us to provide systematic
empirical evidence on the FSIA’s underlying comparative institutional
competence claims and on the competence of the executive and judicial
branches in foreign relations more generally.
A. Building the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Dataset
Our first step was to assemble the considerable amount of data needed
for our analysis. The result was an original dataset that contains detailed
information about foreign sovereign immunity decisions made by both the
State Department and the U.S. district courts.
1. State Department Decisions
The FSI Dataset includes information about 118 requests for immunity
that the State Department received from 1952 (the year of the Tate Letter)
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to 1977 (the year the FSIA became effective). Our primary source of
information about these requests is an appendix to the 1977 edition of the
State Department’s Digest of U.S. Practice of International Law, entitled
Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, May 1952 to January
1977 (hereinafter State Department Report).89 Although the editors of the
State Department Report do not guarantee that it includes every immunity
decision made by the State Department, they explain that it includes “all
diplomatic requests for sovereign immunity, and Department decisions in
response to those requests, that could be gleaned from a search of Department of State and Department of Justice files.”90 Thus, while it is possible
that the State Department Report does not contain all of the State Department’s immunity decisions from that period, it is the most comprehensive
source available.91
2. U.S. District Court Decisions
The FSI Dataset also includes 381 randomly selected U.S. district court
opinions from the Lexis online database in which courts decided whether to
grant immunity under the FSIA.92 The decisions available in Lexis include
89 See STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 61, at 1018 (“The following case reports
trace the history of Department of State decisions concerning the immunities of foreign states,
their agencies and instrumentalities, their property, and their nondiplomatic and nonconsular
officials, beginning with the Tate Letter of May 19, 1952, and ending with the entry into force on
January 19, 1977, of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.”). The State Department Case
Reports were compiled by Michael Sandler, Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of
State, 1975–1977; Detlev F. Vagts, Professor of Law, Harvard University, and Counselor on
International Law, Department of State, 1976–1977; and Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Office of Foreign
Litigation, Department of Justice. Id. at 1017.
90 Id. at 1021.
91 The State Department Report contains 110 numbered cases. Several cases involved suits
against multiple countries arising out of the same incident. For these cases, we treated each
country requesting immunity as a unique observation, resulting in a dataset of 118 observations.
92 We used random selection to reduce the risk of selection bias. See Lee Epstein & Gary
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 110 (2002) (“[R]andom selection is the only
selection mechanism in large-n studies that automatically guarantees the absence of selection bias.”
(emphasis omitted)). Specifically, we searched the Lexis Database for potentially relevant U.S.
district court opinions using the following search query in the Lexis “DIST” (“U.S. District Court
Cases, Combined”) database on May 11, 2011:

“FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT” OR ((“28 USC” OR “28 USCA”)
W/2 (1330 OR 1602 OR 1603 OR 1605 OR 1605A OR 1606 OR 1607 OR 1608 OR
1609 OR 1610 OR 1611))
The search produced 2104 U.S. district court opinions. The opinions were randomly sorted
and then screened to determine which of them contained actual FSIA immunity decisions. We
included such opinions in the FSI Dataset and discarded all others. Of the total of 2104 opinions,
we screened 1235. Of the screened opinions, 381 (30.1%) contained FSIA immunity holdings and
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all decisions published in the Federal Supplement and many, but not all,
decisions that are not. It is well known that published decisions are not
necessarily representative of unpublished decisions93 and that electronic
databases such as Lexis tend to be overpopulated with published decisions.94
In Section III.D., we analyze whether this tendency poses a threat to the
inferences we draw from this sample of decisions, and conclude that it is
unlikely to affect our central findings.95
B. Coding Decisions and Measuring Legal and Political Influences
We coded each foreign sovereign immunity decision in the FSI Dataset
to create variables that both describe the outcome of the immunity decision
and test for a wide range of legal and political factors that can potentially
influence these decisions.96
1. Decision
To indicate the outcome of each decision, we created the variable, Decision. We coded it as 1 (“Yes”) if the decisionmaker (either the State Department or the U.S. district court) granted immunity and 0 (“No”) if the
decisionmaker did not grant immunity.
were included in the FSI Dataset. On this basis, we estimate that there are approximately 633
(30.1% of 2104) district court opinions in the Lexis database containing determinations whether to
grant immunity under the FSIA, and that the FSI Dataset therefore includes well over half of all
such decisions. It is unlikely that using Lexis’s major competitor, Westlaw, as a source of decisions
would significantly change any of the results of the analysis. See Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish:
The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 134
(finding that “Lexis and Westlaw were highly consistent in the cases they reported”).
93 See Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 719, 781-82 (2009) (discussing the potential for selection bias in a choice-of-law study that
only considers published decisions).
94 See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1215 (2013) (explaining how recent Supreme Court cases relating to the
pleadings standard may influence whether lower court judges publish their summary judgment
opinions). In the FSI Dataset, 62.2% of decisions were published in the Federal Supplement, while
the remaining 37.8% were not.
95 See infra Section III.D. Ideally, we would have liked to draw our sample from PACER,
which includes a more comprehensive set of unpublished decisions. However, this is not practicable for our study because PACER is not able to perform the full-text searches needed to identify
foreign sovereign immunity decisions and because of the high cost of obtaining access to decisions
on PACER. See Engstrom, supra note 94, at 1237 (noting the barrier that judges have imposed “by
refusing to use their statutory discretion to grant academic fee waivers for research conducted
using the PACER system”).
96 We coded the decisions in two phases. First, the decisions were allocated among the authors and several research assistants for initial coding. Second, the authors reviewed all coding to
ensure accuracy.
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In thirty cases it reviewed, the State Department either took no action
in response to a request for immunity or the request was withdrawn prior to
any State Department action.97 These cases are difficult to classify: on the
one hand, the State Department did not grant immunity; but on the other
hand, immunity was not formally denied. Out of caution, we took two
different approaches to these cases. First, we performed our analyses
without these thirty cases. These are the analyses we generally report.
Second, we repeated our analyses with these thirty cases included and
Decision coded as 0 (“No”) (since the State Department did not grant
immunity). Generally, the results were similar, and we report them where
they differed significantly.
2. Potential Legal Influences on Immunity Decisions
We also created variables to test for potential legal influences on foreign
sovereign immunity decisionmaking.98 While one might not necessarily
expect the State Department’s decisions to be based primarily on legal
factors,99 one might be tempted to take for granted that legal influences
exert a dominant force on the courts’ immunity decisions. Indeed, the
FSIA’s legislative history suggests that this was taken for granted by the
FSIA’s supporters.100 But there is a well-established line of interdisciplinary
scholarship on judicial decisionmaking. Although there is great debate over
what factors influence judicial decisionmaking, much of this scholarship has
suggested that politics, not law, dominates judicial decisionmaking.101 At
least one legal scholar has argued that political considerations enter into the

97 These thirty cases appear in the State Department Report as the entry numbers 8, 20, 35,
45A, 68, 70, 72, 76, 78, 80, 80, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 98, 100, 100, 101, 103, 103, 104, 105,
106, and 109. STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 61, passim. We treated cases 80, 100, and
103 as two observations each, although a single country was being sued in each case, because the
cases involved two different lawsuits. See id.
98 Unfortunately, the information available for pre-FSIA State Department decisions is
much more limited than that available for post-FSIA court decisions. This missing data problem
means that some variables used to test for legal and political influences are available for district
court decisions but not for some or all State Department decisions. However, we were able to
collect enough data for both institutions to make systematic comparisons.
99 See supra Section I.B. (describing some of the diplomatic pressures the State Department
faced when considering whether to grant immunity).
100 For a discussion of the motives and rationale behind the FSIA and the transferring of
foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking to the judicial branch, see supra Section I.C.
101 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 115 (2002) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions and processes
and suggesting that political factors dominate judicial decisionmaking).
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courts’ foreign sovereign immunity decisions.102 Therefore, we investigate
rather than assume potential legal influences. Specifically, we investigate
two legal factors that potentially influence foreign sovereign immunity
decisions: whether the plaintiff ’s claim is based upon the foreign state’s
commercial activity and whether that activity has connections to the
territory of the United States.
a. Commercial Activity
We measure the first factor—whether the plaintiff ’s claim is based upon
the foreign state’s commercial activity—because it is necessary to trigger the
commercial activity exception, which is the principal exception to foreign
sovereign immunity and the hallmark of the restrictive theory embodied in
the Tate Letter and the FSIA.103 Therefore, if legal factors influence foreign
sovereign immunity decisionmaking, we would expect commercial activity
to be among those factors.
To measure commercial activity, we created two variables. First, we created the variable Corporate Defendant and coded it as 1 (“Yes”) if the foreign
state defendant was a corporate business entity and 0 (“No”) otherwise.
This measure is imperfect insofar as a plaintiff ’s suit against a corporate
defendant will not always necessarily arise out of that defendant’s commercial activity. However, this is unlikely to be the case with much frequency
since corporate business entities ordinarily engage in commercial activity.
For analysis of court decisions, we also created the variable Commercial
Activity and coded it as 1 (“Yes”) if the plaintiff’s claim was based on the
foreign state’s purchase or sale of goods or services, or its investment or
other financial activity (such as issuing or purchasing debt or equity
securities, lending or borrowing money, or guaranteeing debt obligations).
Otherwise, we coded Commercial Activity as 0 (“No”).104 Of course, the
variable does not necessarily capture all activity that could conceivably be
classified as commercial in nature. However, it is designed to capture most
102 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 51, 61-62
(1992) (“In the United States, the core bases of immunity are prescribed in such utterly ambiguous
terms that the [Act] leaves a large measure of discretion in the hands of the courts. U.S. courts
have often exercised their discretion in a highly political fashion.”).
103 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (containing the FSIA commercial activity exception);
supra Section I.B (discussing Tate Letter’s adoption of restrictive theory); see also GEORGE A.
BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 132 (2003) (stating that “[b]y any measure,” the
commercial activity exception is the FSIA’s “principal exception” to immunity).
104 We were careful to code the Commercial Activity variable based on our independent assessment of whether the activity satisfied our coding criteria, and not on whether the court labeled
the activity as “commercial.”

436

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 411

forms of commercial activity.105 Due to lack of information in the State
Department Reports, we were unable to code this variable for the State
Department cases. Therefore, while the Commercial Activity variable is more
precise, the Corporate Defendant variable offers a consistent measure across
the pre-FSIA and post-FSIA periods.
b. Territorial Connections
Another legal factor that potentially influences foreign sovereign immunity decisions—at least in the post-FSIA period—is the connection
between U.S. territory and the activity of the foreign state giving rise to the
plaintiff ’s claim. Most (but not all) exceptions to immunity under the FSIA
require some territorial connection, including the commercial activity
exception, which requires an “activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state,” “an act performed in the United States,” or an act that “causes
a direct effect in the United States.”106 Other FSIA exceptions also require a
territorial connection.107
To measure territorial connections to the United States, we created the
variable U.S. Contacts and, for each decision in the dataset, we coded it as 1
(“Yes”) if the conduct or injury at issue occurred entirely or partially on
U.S. territory, and 0 (“No”) if the conduct and injury occurred purely
outside U.S. territory.108
3. Potential Political Influences on Immunity Decisions
The concerns expressed in the FSIA’s legislative history about the politicization of the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity decisions
focused on a particular class of political factors: factors related to U.S.
relations with the foreign state seeking immunity that might lead a U.S.
105 We also coded an alternative, broader commercial activity variable that was coded as 1
(“Yes”) if the plaintiff ’s claim was based on the foreign state’s employment activity or activity
related to real estate or intellectual property. The use of this alternative variable did not significantly affect our findings.
106 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
107 See id.. §§ 1605(a)(3),(4), and (5) (listing these exceptions as: takings, U.S. property, and
non-commercial tort, respectively). The terrorism exception does not explicitly require a territorial
connection. See id. § 1605A.
108 Specifically, the variable was coded in three steps. First, we coded a place of conduct
variable to indicate the place of the foreign state’s activity: 0 (purely inside U.S. territory), 1
(mixed), or 2 (purely outside U.S. territory). Second, we coded a place of injury variable to
indicate the place of the injury from that conduct: 0 (purely inside U.S. territory), 1 (mixed), or 2
(purely outside U.S. territory). Third, we created the U.S. Contacts variable and coded it as 1
(“Yes”) if either of the other two variables were coded as 0 or 1 (that is, if the conduct or injury
were either partly or all in U.S. territory), and 0 (“No”) otherwise.
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decisionmaker to grant (or withhold) immunity even if the law of foreign
sovereign immunity would indicate otherwise.109 Supporters of the FSIA
made the comparative institutional competence claim that while such factors
influenced the State Department’s immunity decisions, they would not
influence the courts’ decisions.110
To shed empirical light on the validity of this claim, we created variables
to measure five types of potential political influences: (a) the foreign state’s
formal relationship with the United States; (b) the foreign state’s political
importance to the United States; (c) the foreign state’s economic power; (d)
the foreign state’s military power; and (e) the foreign state’s political
system. In addition, we created two additional variables to measure potential political influences rooted in the decisionmaker, rather than the foreign
state: (f) the U.S. decisionmaker’s ideological preferences and (g) the
nationality of the plaintiff.111
a. Foreign State’s Formal Relationship with the United States
For several reasons, a U.S. decisionmaker may be more likely to grant
immunity to a foreign state with which the United States has a formal
relationship. A formal relationship provides a channel of communication
that a foreign state can use to exert diplomatic pressure on the United
States. Moreover, a U.S. decisionmaker may have a sense of duty to provide
the benefit of immunity to a foreign state with which the United States has
a formal relationship, and may be concerned that a denial of immunity
could damage that relationship. One might expect the existence of a formal
relationship to be most significant in State Department decisionmaking
since, as the diplomatic branch of the U.S. government, it is more likely
than the courts to be the target of diplomatic pressure from foreign states
and to be aware of the status and importance of U.S. relationships with
particular foreign states.

109
110

See supra Section I.B (discussing the State Department’s administration of immunity).
See supra Section I.C (discussing the transfer of immunity decisionmaking authority from
the State Department to the courts).
111 Of course, there may be particular political influences in specific cases that these variables
cannot detect; but our goal here is to identify systematic influences resulting from institutional
choice, not factors that might have played a role in one or a few individual cases. In our judgment,
our approach is well suited to accomplish that goal.
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To assess whether the existence of a formal relationship between the
foreign state and the United States affects the likelihood that a U.S. decisionmaker will grant immunity, we created three variables:
U.S. Ally: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if the country requesting
immunity had a formal alliance with the United States in the year of the
decision and 0 (“No”) otherwise.112 Since one of the primary justifications
for the passage of the FSIA was that the State Department was making
politically motivated decisions,113 one might expect that formal allies would
be more likely to receive immunity during the pre-FSIA period.
Diplomatic Representation: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if either the
United States had diplomatic representation in the foreign state or the
foreign state had diplomatic representation in the United States and 0
(“No”) otherwise.114 If diplomatic pressure is being used to influence
immunity decisions, one would expect Diplomatic Representation to have a
positive effect on the probability of immunity.
Troop Deployment: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if there are U.S.
troops deployed in the country requesting immunity in the year of the
decision, and 0 (“No”) otherwise.115 Prior research suggests that the United
States must offer concessions to foreign governments in exchange for the
right to station troops upon their soil.116 As a result, one might expect that
112 We gathered this data from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset. DOUGLAS M.
GIBLER, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCES, 1648–2008 (2009), available at http://
www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Alliances/alliance.htm (follow hyperlink leading to “Data
Set” and then hyperlink to access the data depending on the desired format). This dataset includes
an observation for every pair of countries between 1648 to 2009, coded for the level of alliance that
existed between the pair. Our variable was coded as 1 (“Yes”) if the foreign state held either a
formal alliance of defense, nonaggression, neutrality, or entente. If one of these alliances did not
exist in the decision year, the variable was coded as 0 (“No”).
113 See supra Sections I.B–C.
114 We obtained the underlying data from Reşat Bayer’s Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Dataset. REŞAT BAYER, DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE DATA SET, 1817–2005 (V2006.1), available
at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Diplomatic/Diplomatic.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2014) (follow “diplomatic 2006.1.zip” hyperlink). This dataset provides information on whether a
given country has diplomatic representation in another country. Specifically, we used the variable
“de” from the dataset. Although the data covers 1817 to 2005, it is presented only in five-year
intervals. Therefore, the Diplomatic Representation variable was coded based on whether there was
diplomatic representation in the Decision Year or within a five-year period prior to the Decision
Year.
115 This data was taken from data compiled by the Heritage Foundation that documents all
U.S. troop deployments through 2005. Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2005,
HERITAGE FOUND. (May 24, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-ustroop-deployment-1950-2005 (follow hyperlink indicating availability of the Troop Dataset).
116 See, e.g., Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen Jr., Following the Flag: Troop Deployment and U.S.
Foreign Direct Investment, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 835, 850 (2007) (finding that troop deployment and
alignment of foreign policy priorities lead to increased foreign direct investments or “U.S. capital
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the United States would have political incentives to grant immunity to
foreign governments where U.S. troops are deployed.
b. Foreign State’s Political Importance
Whether a U.S. decisionmaker grants immunity to a foreign state may
also depend partly on the foreign state’s political importance. Regardless of
the existence of a formal relationship between the United States and a
foreign state, the United States may have an interest in eliciting the support
or assistance of politically important foreign states to advance U.S. foreign
policy. To that end, a U.S. decisionmaker may be more likely to grant
immunity to politically important foreign states. Moreover, U.S. decisionmakers may be concerned that a denial of immunity may prompt a
politically important foreign state to withhold support or assistance. We
created three variables to measure political importance:
UNSC Member: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if the foreign state
was a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the year
of decision, and 0 (“No”) otherwise.117 Prior research suggests that major
powers increase aid to states that become members of the Security Council
to influence their votes and obtain their support on matters before the
Council.118 It is thus quite possible that keeping a Security Council member
happy is exactly the kind of political consideration that would lead the State
Department to grant immunity to a foreign state. Therefore, at least in the
pre-FSIA period, one might expect UNSC Member to have a positive effect
on the probability of immunity.
Communist Border: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if the country requesting immunity shared a land border with a Communist state in the

inflows”); Glen Biglaiser & Karl De Rouen, Jr., The Interdependence of U.S. Troop Deployments and
Trade in the Developing World, 5 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 247, 253 (2009) (“We propose that
developing counties seek incentives, mostly of an economic nature, from the U.S. before agreeing
to accept U.S. troop deployments.”).
117 We obtained information about whether a country was a member of the UN Security
Council based on information from the United Nations website. Current Members, UNITED
NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/, archived at http://perma.cc/
XJ8D-WSLM (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
118 See Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, Development Aid and
International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?, 88
J. DEV. ECON. 1, 8 (2009) (citing World Bank panel data that indicated UNSC membership
increases the number of World Bank projects a country receives by approximately 14%); Axel
Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes
in the United Nations Security Council, 53 EUR. ECON. REV. 742, 746 (2009) (citing International
Monetary Fund (IMF) panel data that indicates UNSC membership increases the number of IMF
loans a country receives and reduces the number of conditions on the loans).
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decision year, and 0 (“No”) otherwise.119 During the Cold War, a goal of
U.S. foreign policy was containing Communism. As a result, states that
shared a border with Communist countries were more likely to receive
assistance from the United States.120 Since these states may be more likely
to receive grants of immunity, we coded this variable for all requests
received in 1991 or earlier.
Communist State: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if the country requesting immunity was a Communist country in the year that it requested
immunity, and as 0 (“No”) otherwise.121 Given the political salience of
communism during the Cold War, we have included this variable to assess
whether being a Communist state influenced the likelihood of immunity.
c. Foreign State’s Economic Power
The likelihood of immunity may also depend on the foreign state’s
economic power. A U.S. decisionmaker may grant immunity to attract or
preserve economic benefits from a foreign state, and may be concerned that
a denial of immunity could prompt a foreign state to withhold those
benefits. The more economically powerful a foreign state, the more heavily
these considerations are likely to weigh in favor of granting immunity. We
created three variables to measure economic power:
GDP Per Capita: This variable equals the estimated per capita gross domestic product (“GDP Per Capita”) for the citizens in the state requesting
immunity in the decision year.122
119 This variable was coded by the authors based on whether the foreign state shared a land
border with a Communist state in the decision year. For the list of Communist countries used to
make this determination, see Communism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBERTARIANISM 81, 83
(Ronald Hamowy et al. eds., 2008). The countries that have had a Communist regime are: USSR
(1917–1991), China (1949–present), Poland (1945–1990), East Germany (1949–1990), Hungary
(1948–1989), Czechoslovakia (1948–1989), Yugoslavia (1946–1990), Albania (1944–1991), Bulgaria
(1946–1990), North Korea (1948–present), Cuba (1959–present), North Vietnam (1954–1976),
Vietnam (1976–present), Laos (1975–present), Cambodia (1975–1993), Ethiopia (1975–1991),
Angola (1976–1993), Mozambique (1974–1994), Nicaragua (1979–1990), and Afghanistan (1978–
1992). Id.
120 See James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger & Steve C. Poe, Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy:
Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War, 60 J. POL. 63, 78 (1998) (finding that “[n]ations that
bordered Communist states were statistically more likely to receive aid and increased amounts of
assistance during the Cold War”).
121 See Communism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBERTARIANISM, supra note 119, at 85.
122 For our GDP data, we used imputed values of the Penn World Tables. ALAN HESTON, ROBERT SUMMERS & BETTINA ATEN, CTR. FOR INT’L COMPARISONS OF PROD., INCOME & PRICES AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENN WORLD TABLE VERSION 7.1, (Nov. 2012), available at
https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php; see also Spencer L. James et al., Developing a
Comprehensive Time Series of GDP Per Capita for 210 Countries from 1950 to 2015, 10 POPULATION
HEALTH METRICS, no. 12, 2012, at 1, 5-6, available at http://www.pophealthmetrics.com/content/
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U.S. Exports: This variable equals the value in millions of U.S. dollars of
the goods that the United States exported to the country requesting immunity in the decision year.123
OECD Member: We coded this variable as 1 (“Yes”) if the foreign state
was a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes many of the world’s most economically
powerful states, in the decision year and 0 (“No”) otherwise.124
d. Foreign State’s Military Power
The United States may have an interest in fostering the support of or
good relations with foreign states that have a powerful military. A U.S.
decisionmaker may view a grant of immunity as one way to foster these
relationships, and a denial of immunity as potentially undermining them.
As a measure of the foreign state’s military power, we used the variable
CINC, which represents the Correlates of War Composite Index of National
Capability score (CINC Score) for each country in the decision year.125

pdf/1478-7954-10-12.pdf (updating the widely used Penn World Tables GDP Per Capita estimates
by using statistical techniques to “impute” missing values from 1950 to the present). The
advantage of the James data over other sources is that it allows a consistent GDP estimate for all
observations in the FSI Dataset.
123 Our data come from the Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook version 2.01.
KATHERINE BARBIERI ET AL., CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT TRADE DATA SET CODEBOOK,
VERSION 2.01, available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Trade/Trade.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (follow hyperlink under “Earlier Version” section); see also Katherine
Barbieri, Omar M.G. Keshk & Brian M. Pollins, Trading Data: Evaluating Our Assumptions and
Coding Rules, 26 CONFLICT MGM’T & PEACE SCI. 471, 477-80 (2009), available at
http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/26/5/471 (introducing the Correlates of War Bilateral Trade
dataset). This dataset provides estimates of the trade flows between pairs of countries in each year
between 1870 and 2006. The data used here is taken from the “flow2” variable, where “importer1”
is the United States.
124 See Members and Partners: Current Membership, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/about/
membersandpartners, archived at http://perma.cc/PDK8-5Y3E (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (noting
that OECD members “include many of the world’s most advanced countries but also emerging
countries like Mexico, Chile and Turkey”).
125 Our data come from version 4.0 of the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities
dataset. National Material Capabilities (v4.0), CORRELATES OF WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
COW2%20Data/Capabilitites/nmc4.htm (follow hyperlink under “Data Availability and Download” section) (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). This dataset covers the period from 1816 to 2007. The
data used come from the CINC variable. This variable is a composite of six factors that measure a
country’s material national capability: total population, urban population, military personnel,
military expenditures, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production. Id.; see also J.
David Singer, Stuart Bremer & John Stuckey, Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power
War, 1820–1965 (describing how the distribution of national capabilities contributes to the likelihood
of war in foreign states), in PEACE, WAR, AND NUMBERS 19-48 (Bruce M. Russett ed., 1972).
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e. Foreign State’s Political System
The foreign state’s political system is another factor that may influence
foreign sovereign immunity decisions. According to liberal international law
theory, legal relations between two liberal democracies differ systematically
from legal relations between liberal and non-liberal democracies and
between two non-liberal democracies.126 Specifically, the “courts of liberal
states handle cases involving other liberal states differently from the way
they handle cases involving nonliberal states.”127 Critics of liberal international law theory reject the claim that U.S. courts relate differently to liberal
democracies than to other regimes.128 Moreover, the theory does not yield
clear predictions about whether a U.S. court will be more or less likely to
grant immunity to a democracy or non-democracy.129 Nevertheless, if the
theory is correct, then U.S. foreign sovereign immunity decisions should
depend, at least in part, on whether the foreign state is a liberal democracy.
To assess this hypothesis, we created the variable Democracy. To do so,
we used the Polity IV dataset, which rates governments on a scale from -10
(most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic).130 Following conventional
practice in international relations scholarship,131 we coded foreign states as 1

126 See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of
State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1917 (1992) (“Liberal internationalist theory locates the
origins of differences in international behavior between liberal and nonliberal states in the actions
of domestic political institutions.”).
127 Id.
128 See generally José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 217 (2001) (arguing that regime type does not determine
interactions by U.S. courts with other courts).
129 See Burley, supra note 126, at 1923 (“The determining factor guiding the actual legal
outcome [when liberal courts are called upon to adjudicate transnational disputes involving
nonliberal states] will be the particular strategy adopted to mediate the tension between a
preference for political rather than legal resolution and a desire to preserve judicial autonomy.”).
130 MONTY G. MARSHALL, TED ROBERT GURR & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT:
POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 1800–2010 (2011), available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (follow the “Excel Series” hyperlink under the
section “Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset”) (last visited Nov.
7, 2014). For each country between 1800 and 2010, the Polity IV dataset provides scores of how
autocratic to democratic its government is. Id. The dataset is widely used in empirical work
studying international relations and international law. The specific Polity IV variable used is the
polity2 variable, which is a composite indicator of democracy and autocracy. Id.
131 For more information on using this method to classify a state as a democracy, see Jason
Lyall, Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War
Outcomes and Duration, 64 INT’L ORG. 167, 176-77 (2010) (describing the variable as “follow[ing]
standard practice in international relations and treat[ing] democracy as a binary variable [by
coding a regime] as a democracy if its Polity2 score is ≥ 7 in the Polity IV dataset” (footnote
omitted)).
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(“Yes”) if they had a Polity score of 7 or higher in the decision year, and as 0
(“No”) otherwise.
f. U.S. Decisionmaker’s Ideological Preferences
The decisionmaker’s ideological preferences are another political factor
that may influence foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking.132 On the
one hand, other things being equal, one might expect conservatives to be
more likely than liberals to grant immunity. Prior scholarship suggests that
conservatives have a more anti–forum shopping and “pro-defendant tilt,” and
may generally more strongly disfavor litigation than liberals.133 Moreover,
conservative judges may, on average, have a stronger preference for an
expansive norm of sovereignty (and hence sovereign immunity) than
liberals. On the other hand, foreign state immunity is an international law
principle involving deference to foreign states. If conservatives are, on
average, less supportive of international law and less likely to defer to
foreign interests than liberals, they may be less likely than liberals to grant
immunity to foreign states.134
To assess this hypothesis, we created two variables. First, we created the
variable Decisionmaker’s Party and coded it as 1 (“Republican”) if the State
Department was the decisionmaker and the President in the year of the
decision was Republican.135 We also coded this variable as 1 if the decisionmaker was a judge nominated by a Republican president.136 Otherwise,
we coded Decisionmaker’s Party as 0 (“Democrat”).
132 In the social science literature on judicial decisionmaking, this theory is known as the
“attitudinal model.” See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 101 (theorizing that justices make
decisions based on policy preferences).
133 See George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping—Why Doesn’t a Conservative Court
Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 680-94 (1993) (investigating a possible connection
between conservatism and forum shopping, pro-defendant actions and litigation and providing
support for this connection but also alternate explanations).
134 Cf. Opinion Leaders Turn Cautious, Public Looks Homeward: America’s Place in the World,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.peoplepress.org/2005/11/17/opinion-leaders-turn-cautious-public-looks-homeward, archived at http://perma.cc/E
NZ7-FTWQ (finding that Republicans were less likely than Democrats to agree that the “U.S.
should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on
their own” and that the U.S. “should cooperate fully with the United Nations”).
135 This coding is based on the assumption that, on average, the State Department’s legal
advisor is more likely to be conservative if the President is a Republican.
136 This is a common measure of judges’ ideological attitudes. See Tracey E. George & Lee
Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 328 (1992)
(using the party of the nominating president as a proxy for ideological attitudes). We obtained the
data on nominating presidents from the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–present,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H8Y2-HDLJ.
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Second, for post-FSIA decisions only, we used the variable Judicial
Common Space, which equals the Judicial Common Space score for the
judge.137 The score ranges from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative).138
The Judicial Common Space score is “the state-of-the-art measure” of the
ideological preferences of U.S. district court judges.139 However, the Judicial
Common Space measure, like the party of the nominating president, may
underestimate the impact of judicial ideology.140 Therefore, our results are
“best interpreted as providing only a lower bound on [the impact of]
ideology.”141
g. Nationality of the Plaintiff
Finally, the nationality of the plaintiff may influence foreign sovereign
immunity decisions.142 The State Department, though charged with the
conduct of U.S. foreign relations, may nevertheless be less inclined to deny
court access to a U.S. claimant than to a foreign claimant against a foreign
137 The source of the data is Christina L. Boyd, Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data,
CHRISTINA L. BOYD (2010), http://cLboyd.net/ideology.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/8ZZJ-H5L8.
138 Id. Developed by judicial decisionmaking scholars, the Judicial Common Space scores are
based on the NOMINATE Common Space scores that are widely used to measure the ideology of
presidents and members of Congress, taking into account the practice of senatorial courtesy. See
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common Space,
23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306 (2007) (discussing the history of the NOMINATE Common
Space scores and their influence in developing the Judicial Common Space score); Michael W.
Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan
Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 631 (2001) (explaining the factors impacting the Judicial
Common Space score). Specifically, in the Judicial Common Space data,

[i]f a judge is appointed from a state where the President and at least one home-state
Senator are of the same party, the nominee is assigned the NOMINATE Common
Space score of the home-state Senator (or the average of the home-state Senators if
both members of the delegation are from the President’s party). If neither homestate Senator is of the President’s party, the nominee receives the NOMINATE
Common Space score of the appointing president.
Epstein et al., supra, at 306.
139 Id.
140 See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We
Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 170-71 (2009) (finding that using the party of the
nominating president as a measure of judicial ideology is “systematically biased toward understating
the impact of ideology” due to inherent inaccuracies).
141 Id. at 171.
142 The terrorism exception to immunity contained in the FSIA is tied to the citizenship of
the claimant or victim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(2)(ii) (2012) (requiring the claimant to be a national
of the United States, a member of the armed forces, an employee of the U.S. government, or
performing a U.S. government contract for a U.S. court to hear a claim against a foreign state
based on this exception).
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state. Prior scholarship provides support for this hypothesis in judicial
decisionmaking.143 At least one study, however, suggests that foreign
claimants may actually fare better in U.S. courts.144 To assess the hypothesis
that a grant of immunity is less likely when a U.S. citizen is a plaintiff, we
created the variable U.S. Plaintiff, and we coded it as 1 (“Yes”) if the plaintiff
is a U.S. citizen and 0 (“No”) otherwise.145
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in our analysis, along with the
sources of the data. Appendix A presents complete summary statistics.

Table 1: Variables in the FSI Dataset
Category

Variable

Values

Source

OUTCOME

Decision

0=immunity denied;
1=immunity granted

State Department
Reports, court opinions

LEGAL
FACTORS
Commercial
Activity
Territorial
Connections
POLITICAL
FACTORS
Formal
Relationship

Corporate
Defendant
Commercial
Activity
U.S. Contacts

U.S. Ally
Diplomatic
Representation

0=no; 1=yes
0=no; 1=yes
0=no; 1=yes

0=no alliance;
1=alliance
0=no diplomatic
representation;
1=diplomatic
representation

State Department
Reports, court opinions
State Department
Reports, court opinions
State Department
Reports, court opinions

COW Formal Alliance
Database
COW Diplomatic
Exchange Dataset

143 See Utpal Bhattacharya, Neal E. Galpin & Bruce Haslem, The Home Court Advantage in
International Corporate Litigation, 50 J.L. & ECON. 625, 648 (2007) (finding that U.S. corporate
defendants have a “home court advantage” and are less likely to lose in U.S. federal courts than
foreign corporate defendants); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1497, 1504 (2003) (finding that U.S. parties are substantially more likely than foreign parties
to prevail in patent litigation in U.S. courts, and concluding that U.S. judges and American juries
exhibit a “xenophobic bias”).
144 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1120, 1139 (1996) (finding no pro-domestic party bias, and presenting evidence that foreign
parties fare better than U.S. parties when they litigate in U.S. courts).
145 If there were both U.S. and non-U.S. plaintiffs, we coded U.S. Plaintiff as 1 (“Yes”).
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Troop
Deployment
Political
Importance

UNSC
Member
Borders
Communist

Economic Power

Communist
State
GDP Per
Capita
U.S. Exports
OECD
Member

Military Power
Political
System
Decisionmaker’s
Ideology

Plaintiff ’s
Nationality
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CINC Score

0=U.S. troops not
deployed; 1=U.S.
troops deployed
0=not UNSC
member;
1=UNSC member
0=does not border
Communist state;
1=borders Communist
state
0=not Communist;
1=Communist
257 (min) to
51,450 (max) USD
0 (min) to 176,300
(max) million USD
0=not OECD
member;
1=OECD member
0.0 to 0.20
(continuous scale)

Decisionmaker’s
Party

0=not democratic;
1=democratic
0=Democrat;
1=Republican

Judicial
Common Space

-1 (most liberal) to 1
(most conservative)

U.S. Plaintiff

0=no; 1=yes

Democracy

Heritage Global U.S.
Troop Deployment
Data
United Nations
Records
Encyclopedia of
Libertarianism
Encyclopedia of
Libertarianism
Imputed Penn World
Tables
COW International
Trade Dataset
OECD Records
COW National
Material Capabilities
Data
Polity IV Project
Federal Judicial Center
Bio Data
Boyd Federal District
Court Judge Ideology
Data
State Department
Reports, court opinions

III. EVALUATING THE CLAIMS: FINDINGS
Using the FSI Dataset described in Part II, we now present the results
of our empirical assessment of the FSIA’s underlying comparative institutional competence claims. First, we analyze the State Department’s foreign
sovereign immunity decisions to assess the claim made by the FSIA’s
supporters that those decisions were influenced by political more than legal
factors. Contrary to that claim, we do not find evidence of systematic
political influences on the State Department’s decisions, but we do find
evidence of legal influences. Second, we analyze the U.S. district courts’
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decisions to assess whether, as the FSIA’s legislative history promised, the
courts base their immunity decisions on legal rather than political factors.
We do find evidence of legal influences on the courts’ decisions, but we also
find evidence of systematic political influences. Third, we analyze the two
institutions’ decisions together to assess whether, other things being equal,
the transfer from the State Department to the courts enhanced court access
for litigants in suits against foreign sovereigns by reducing the likelihood of
immunity. We do not find evidence of a significant change.
Overall, these findings challenge the FSIA’s motivating comparative
institutional competence claims. Beyond foreign sovereign immunity, these
findings suggest that the executive branch may be more institutionally
capable of making sound foreign relations decisions than the conventional
wisdom suggests, and that merely transferring foreign relations decisions to
the judiciary does not ensure that those decisions will be free from political
influences.
A. Before the FSIA: Factors Influencing the State Department’s
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Decisions
To assess the extent to which legal and political factors may have systematically influenced the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity
decisions, we analyze those decisions using two statistical methods: simple
bivariate logit regression analysis and multiple logit regression analysis.
Logit analysis is the standard social science method for estimating the
effects of hypothesized influences or “independent variables” (in our case,
our hypothesized legal and political factors) on an outcome that has only
two possible results (referred to as a “binary dependent variable”—in our
case, a grant or a denial of immunity).146 We use this method to estimate the
effects of the legal and political variables discussed above on the probability
that the State Department granted immunity.
Bivariate logit analysis does this while only examining a single variable
(measuring the influence of a single legal or political factor),147 whereas
multivariate logit analysis does this while controlling for the influence of a
number of other variables (representing multiple legal and political factors).148 Bivariate analysis can efficiently detect possible influences of
individual factors on immunity decisions, while multivariate analysis can
often provide a more nuanced understanding by estimating the effect of
146 See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND
MULTILEVEL HIERARCHICAL MODELS 79 (2007).
147 See id. at 79-81 (providing an example of a logistic regression using only one variable).
148 See id. at 90-92 (providing a more complex example using multiple predictors or variables).
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each individual factor taking into account the effects of other factors. When
the results of bivariate but not multivariate analysis indicate that a particular factor has an influence (or vice versa), the evidence of influence is still
important to consider but not as strong as when the results are consistent.
1. Bivariate Analysis: The Influence of Individual
Legal and Political Factors
Figure 1 graphically presents the results of fifteen bivariate logit regressions that estimate the influence of a wide range of legal and political
factors on foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking.149 Each box represents a separate regression.150 The circles are estimates of the effects of the
indicated legal and political variables on the likelihood of immunity when
those variables change from 0 to 1 (for binary variables) or from their 25th
to their 75th percentile values (for continuous variables).151 Because no
statistical estimate can be absolutely certain, we also include a line that
indicates each estimate’s 90% confidence interval: in 90% of applications of
the same sampling procedure, the actual effect will lie within that interval.152 The circle and line are solid when there is at least 90% confidence of a
149 Traditional regression tables for all regression results are presented in Appendix B. For a
defense of presenting regression results graphically, see generally Jonathan P. Kastellec & Eduardo
L. Leoni, Using Graphs Instead of Tables in Political Science, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 755 (2007) (arguing
that graphs increase clarity and facilitate reader understanding).
150 All regressions conducted for this project were done using the statistical package “Zelig”
for R. See generally Kosuke Imai, Gary King, & Olivia Lau, Toward a Common Framework for
Statistical Analysis and Development, 17 J. COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STAT. 892 (2008)
(summarizing the structured aspects of “Zelig”); Gary King, Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software,
GARY KING, http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig (last visited on Nov. 7, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/G4VN-2QVE.
151 For binary explanatory variables, the estimated effect is the simulated first difference for
the variable moving from 0 to 1. For continuous explanatory variables, the estimated effect is the
simulated first difference for the variable moving from its 25th to its 75th percentile values. For an
explanation of how and why first differences are simulated, see Gary King, Michael Tomz, & Jason
Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 347, 351 (2000). For a technical explanation of estimating first differences to interpret
logit regression, see GARY KING, UNIFYING POLITICAL METHODOLOGY: THE LIKELIHOOD
THEORY OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 107-08 (1998).
152 See Epstein & King, supra note 92, at 50 & n.145 (noting that uncertainty is inherent in all
statistical methods of inference, and explaining that confidence intervals communicate the extent
of this uncertainty by indicating that, for a 95% confidence interval, the true population mean “will
be captured within the stated confidence interval in 95 of 100 applications of the same sampling
procedure”). Many studies use a 95% confidence interval. Id. However, it is acceptable to use a
90% confidence interval; the key is that the level of uncertainty must be communicated clearly. Id.
at 50. Moreover, other empirical legal scholarship has used a 90% confidence interval. See, e.g.,
Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1082 n.143 (1998); Adam S. Chilton,
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positive or negative effect on the likelihood of immunity. Otherwise, the
circle is open and the line is dotted. Thus, circles show the estimated
percentage change in the likelihood of immunity for each variable, black
lines to the left of zero mean that the variable indicates a statistically
significant lower likelihood of immunity, and black lines to the right of zero
indicate a statistically significant higher likelihood of immunity.

The Influence of International human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 15
CHI. J. INT’L L. 110, 127 (2014); Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King & Jeffery A. Segal, The
Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 73 (2005);
Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137, 153 n.48 (2013);
Thomas J. Forr, Want Less Ideology on the Federal Bench? Pay Judges More, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 859,
883-84 (2010).
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Figure 1: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on Probability of
Immunity (State Department, Bivariate Analysis)153
U.S. Contacts

Legal
Factors

Corporate Defendant
-0.25

0

0.25

-0.25

Economic
Power

Political
Importance

Formal
Relationship

(p = 0.013)

U.S. Ally
-0.25

0

Diplomatic Rep.
0.25

-0.25

0

0.25

Troop Deployment
-0.25

0

0.25

(p = 0.42)

(p = 0.80)

UNSC Member

Borders Communist

Communist State

-0.25

0

0.25

-0.25

0

0.25

-0.25

0

0.25

(p = 0.78)

(p = 0.50)

(p = 0.14)

GDP Per Capita

U.S. Exports

OECD Member

-0.25

0

0.25

-0.25

0

0.25

-0.25

(p = 0.30)

0

0.25

0.25

Democracy
Political
System

-0.25

0

(p = 0.45)

CINC Score

-0.25

0

0.25

(p = 0.19)

(p = 0.53)

Decisionmaker's Party

U.S. Plaintiff

-0.25

0

(p = 0.48)

0.25

Nationality
of Plaintiff

Military
Power

0.25

(p = 0.20)

(p = 0.15)

Decisionmaker's
Ideology

0

(p = 0.80)

-0.25

0

0.25

(p = 0.45)

153 This figure presents bivariate logit estimates of the effects of individual legal and political
factors on the likelihood of immunity in the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity
decisions. Specifically, in this figure and the regression figures that follow, the circles are estimates
of the effects of the indicated legal and political variables on the likelihood of immunity in State
Department decisions when those variables change from 0 to 1 (for binary variables) or from their
25th to 75th percentile values (for continuous variables). The lines are 90% confidence intervals.
The circles and lines are solid when the 90% confidence interval does not cross zero. Otherwise,
circles are open and lines are dotted.
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The results do not reveal evidence that political factors systematically
influenced the State Department’s immunity decisions. The only variable
that achieves statistical significance at the 90% level is a legal variable,
Corporate Defendant. In cases where the foreign state defendant was a
corporate entity, the State Department was an estimated 36% less likely to
grant immunity.154 As explained above, customary international law reflected, and the State Department officially recognized, the restrictive theory of
foreign sovereign immunity, according to which foreign states are not
immune from suits based on their commercial activity.155 The negative effect
of the Corporate Defendant variable suggests that the prevailing legal standard did indeed systematically influence the State Department’s immunity
decisions: immunity was less likely when the foreign state was a corporate
entity (and thus presumably engaged in commercial activity).
The fourteen other variables presented in Figure 1 do not have a statistically significant influence on the likelihood of immunity. This suggests that
formal relationships, political importance, economic power, and military
power did not systematically affect the State Department’s immunity
determinations. This was true for the variables presented in Figure 1 and for
a range of other political variables that we coded as part of this project.156
Although these results do not prove that there were no political influences
on the State Department’s immunity decisions, they challenge the conventional account by suggesting that any such influences were not consistent
and systematic.157

154 The p-value of the statistic is 0.01. The result is the same when including the thirty cases
dropped from our dataset because the foreign state either withdrew its request or the State
Department did not respond. See supra subsection II.B.1. When including these cases, Corporate
Defendant predicts a 35% lower likelihood of immunity (p-value≤0.01).
155 See supra Section I.B.
156 We also tested whether a country was more likely to receive a suggestion of immunity if it
was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, or World Trade Organization, or a recipient of U.S. economic or military aid.
None of these variables were statistically significant predictors of suggestions of immunity at the
0.10 level.
157 These results are also robust to including the thirty cases that were dropped from our
dataset. See supra subsection II.B.1. Only one variable, Communist State, achieves statistical
significance after re-estimating the regressions presented in Figure 1 when including these
additional cases. Communist State predicts a 21% increased likelihood of receiving immunity (pvalue=0.05) when these cases are included.
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2. Multivariate Analysis: The Combined Influence of
Multiple Legal and Political Factors
Although the bivariate analysis did not reveal systematic political influences, it is possible that some political influences may become apparent
after controlling for the effects of other variables. To explore this possibility,
we used multivariate logit regression, which controls for a range of political
and legal factors simultaneously. The results are presented in Figure 2. The
figure presents four separate regression analyses or “models.” The circles are
estimates of the effects of the indicated legal and political variables on the
likelihood of immunity when those variables change from 0 to 1 (for binary
variables) or from their 25th to 75th percentile values (for continuous
variables), while all other variables are held constant at their mean.158 As
with our bivariate analyses, circles and lines are solid when there is at least
90% confidence of a positive or negative effect on the likelihood of immunity. Otherwise, the circles are open and the lines are dotted.

158

See supra note 151.
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Figure 2: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on Probability of
Immunity (State Department, Multivariate Analysis)159
Model 1
Base Model
& Alliance Variables
(n = 88)
Corporate Defend.

Model 2
Expanded Legal
& Alliance Variables
(n = 38)

Model 3
Base Model
& Communist Variables
(n = 88)

Corporate Defend.

Corporate Defend.

Model 4
Expanded Legal
& Communist Variables
(n = 38)
Corporate Defend.

U.S. Contacts

U.S. Ally

U.S. Ally

UNSC Member

U.S. Contacts

U.S. Ally

UNSC Member

U.S. Ally

UNSC Member

UNSC Member

Borders Communist

GDP Per Capita

GDP Per Capita

CINC Score

CINC Score

Democracy

Democracy

Decisionmaker's Party

Communist

Communist

GDP Per Capita

GDP Per Capita

CINC Score

CINC Score

Democracy

Decisionmaker's Party

Democracy

Decisionmaker's Party

U.S. Plaintiff
-0.5

0

0.5

Δ in predicted
probabilities

-0.5

0

Borders Communist

Decisionmaker's Party

U.S. Plaintiff
0.5

Δ in predicted
probabilities

-0.5

0

0.5

Δ in predicted
probabilities

-0.5

0

0.5

Δ in predicted
probabilities

Model 1 includes the legal variable Corporate Defendant, the formal relationship variable U.S. Ally, the political importance variable UNSC Member,
the economic power variable GDP Per Capita, the military power variable
CINC, the political system variable Democracy, and the decisionmaker’s

159 This figure presents multivariate logit estimates of the effects of each indicated legal and
political variable on the likelihood of immunity in the State Department’s foreign sovereign
immunity decisions, while holding other variables constant at their means.
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ideology variable Decisionmaker’s Party. Model 2 includes these same variables,
but adds the variables U.S. Contacts and U.S. Plaintiff. Model 3 contains the
same variables as Model 1, but adds the variables Borders Communist and
Communist State. Finally, Model 4 contains all of these variables. Unfortunately, Models 2 and 4 contain only a small number of observations (thirtyeight) due to the lack of information about U.S. contacts and the plaintiff ’s
nationality for many State Department decisions. This reduces these
models’ sensitivity to the effects of legal and political factors.
Consistent with the bivariate results, there is evidence that legal factors
influenced the State Department’s decisions. Corporate Defendant has a
negative effect on the likelihood of immunity in all four multivariate
models. The effect is statistically significant in Models 1 and 3, and barely
misses significance at the 0.1 level in Models 2 and 4.160
In contrast, the results provide little evidence that political factors systematically influenced the State Department’s immunity decisions. However, there is some evidence that as the foreign state’s GDP Per Capita
increases, the likelihood of immunity increases. This effect is statistically
significant in Models 1 and 3. The other variables designed to assess whether the State Department was systematically rewarding allies did not achieve
statistical significance in any of the model specifications. This is not only
true of the models presented, but also for a range of alternative models that
we investigated.161
Overall, the results of these bivariate and multivariate logit analyses
suggest that at least one key legal factor—Commercial Activity—influenced
the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity decisions.162 On the
other hand, our analyses do not reveal consistent evidence of systematic
political influences on the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity
decisions. This runs counter to the perceptions expressed in the FSIA’s
legislative history.163 Of course, the absence of systematic influences does
not preclude the possibility that political factors influenced certain
individual decisions. Nevertheless, our analysis raises doubts about the

160
161

For Models 2 and 4, the p-value for Corporate Defendant is 0.12.
This includes adding in the thirty cases where the foreign state withdrew its request for
immunity or the State Department did not respond.
162 Another legal variable, U.S. Contacts, does not have a significant effect in our analyses of
immunity decisions. However, because territorial connections were considered as part of an
independent judicial analysis of personal jurisdiction in the pre-FSIA period—rather than
incorporated into the immunity analysis as it is under the FSIA—we do not interpret the lack of
an effect as an indication that the State Department was neglecting a legal factor that it should
have considered.
163 See supra Sections I.B–C.
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FSIA’s underlying assumption that the State Department was insufficiently
competent to make immunity decisions based on legal rather than political
factors, and that a transfer of authority to the judicial branch was necessary
to depoliticize foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking. This is one side
of the comparative institutional competence equation.
B. After the FSIA: Factors Influencing the Courts’
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Decisions
The other side of the equation is the competence of the judicial branch.
The FSIA was motivated not only by the perception that the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity decisions were excessively influenced by
political rather than legal factors—a perception, as we have just seen, that
may have been exaggerated—but also by a comparative institutional competence claim that the judiciary would be better able to make immunity
decisions based on law, not politics. We empirically assess the validity of
this claim by applying the same methods used above. While we find evidence of legal influences for certain types of foreign sovereign immunity
decisions by the U.S. district courts, we also find strong evidence of political
influences. Thus, these findings—together with our findings regarding the
State Department presented above—do not support the claim that the
courts are more institutionally competent than the State Department to
make immunity decisions independent from political factors.
1. Bivariate Analysis: The Influence of Individual
Legal and Political Factors
We again begin with bivariate analysis to explore the potential influences of individual legal and political factors on immunity decisions.
Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C graphically depict the results of sixteen bivariate
logit regressions that estimate the effects of legal and political variables on
the likelihood that a U.S. district court will grant immunity.
Figure 3A analyzes all district court decisions in the FSI Dataset together. One legal factor—U.S. Contacts—has the expected negative effect on the
likelihood of immunity. However, while the bivariate regression results for
the State Department’s decisions did not reveal evidence of systematic
political influences, the same cannot be said of the U.S. district courts’
decisions. A wide range of political factors appear to influence outcomes:
U.S. Ally, Diplomatic Representation, UNSC Member, GDP Per Capita, U.S.
Exports, and OECD Member are all associated with states being between 10%
and 30% more likely to receive a grant of sovereign immunity. In addition,
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Judicial Common Space has a statistically significant negative effect on the
likelihood of immunity, suggesting that more conservative judges are less
likely to grant immunity than more liberal judges.
Figure 3A: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on Probability of
Immunity (Courts, Bivariate Analysis, All Decisions)164
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The commercial activity exception is the FSIA’s most frequently litigated
exception to immunity.165 The FSIA defines the scope of the exception with
164 This figure presents bivariate logit estimates of the effects of individual legal and political
factors on the likelihood of immunity in the U.S. district courts’ foreign sovereign immunity
decisions.
165 See BERMANN, supra note 103, at 132 (explaining that “[b]y any measure,” the commercial
activity exception is the FSIA’s “principal exception” to immunity). Of the 381 district court
decisions in the FSI Dataset, 221 (58.0%) are commercial activity exception decisions.
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some specificity.166 It provides that “[a] ‘commercial activity’ means either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction
or act.”167 It does not define the term “commercial” other than to specify
that “[t]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”168 The Supreme Court, however, has concluded that a state engages in “commercial activity” within the
meaning of the FSIA when it “acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the
manner of a private player within it.”169 Although confusion can arise in
specific cases about the commercial character of a foreign state’s activity, the
Supreme Court’s clarification provides useful guidance for the lower
courts.170 Therefore, it is possible that foreign sovereign immunity decisions
involving commercial activity will differ from other foreign sovereign
immunity decisions. In particular, insofar as the number of commercial
activity decisions has allowed the common law governing the commercial
activity exception to develop more than the common law governing the
FSIA’s other exceptions to immunity, judges may be more doctrinally
constrained when deciding that issue: legal influences may be stronger and
political influences may be weaker in commercial activity exception decisions than other decisions.171
Figures 3B and 3C explore this possibility. Figure 3B presents bivariate
logit regression results only for U.S. district court decisions other than
those in which the issue was whether the commercial activity exception
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (requiring two conditions to be satisfied for the exception to apply: the foreign state’s activity must be “commercial” and there must be some territorial
nexus to the United States).
167 Id. § 1603(d) (2012).
168 Id.
169 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). The Court further
explained:

[T]he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive
or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue
is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private party engages in “trade
and traffic or commerce.”
Id.
170 See Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 552 (2002) (suggesting that there is no need for statutory
clarification given the Supreme Court’s guidance).
171 See Andrew Eggers & Arthur Spirling, Legal Ambiguity and Judicial Bias: Evidence from
Electoral Corruption Trials in 19th-Century Britain 2-3 ( July 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2099025 (arguing that increasing legal clarity reduces bias in
judicial decisionmaking).
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applies. None of the legal variables have statistically significant effects on
the likelihood of immunity, but a variety of political variables do have
significant effects, including U.S. Ally, Diplomatic Representation, UNSC
Member, GDP Per Capita, OECD Member, Democracy, and Judicial Common
Space.
Figure 3B: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on
Probability of Immunity (Courts, Bivariate Analysis,
Non-Commercial Activity Decisions Only)172
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172 This figure presents bivariate logit estimates of the effects of individual legal and political
factors on the likelihood of immunity in the U.S. district courts’ foreign sovereign immunity
decisions (other than commercial activity exception decisions).
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In contrast, Figure 3C indicates that two legal factors associated with the
commercial activity exception—Commercial Activity and U.S. Contacts—have
the expected negative effects on the likelihood of immunity in district court
decisions in which the issue is whether the commercial activity exception
applies. Consistently with the FSIA’s commercial activity exception,
granting immunity is less likely (since the exception is likely to apply) when
the plaintiff ’s claim is based on the foreign state’s commercial activity and
when that activity has territorial connections to the United States. Although
there continues to be some evidence of political effects (both OECD Member
and Democracy have statistically significant positive effects), these effects are
more limited than in Figure 3B. These results suggest a more nuanced
assessment of the FSIA’s underlying comparative institutional competence
claim: while the courts may not be completely immune from political
influences in foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking, they are more
constrained by legal factors and less likely to base their decisions on political
factors in doctrinally well-developed areas such as the commercial activity
exception.
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Figure 3C: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on
Probability of Immunity (Courts, Bivariate Analysis,
Commercial Activity Decisions Only)173
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2. Multivariate Analysis: The Combined Influence of
Multiple Legal and Political Factors
To further assess the legal and political factors influencing the district
courts’ foreign sovereign immunity decisions, we again used multivariate
logit analysis. To facilitate comparison to our analysis of the State Department’s
173 This figure presents bivariate logit estimates of the effects of individual legal and political
factors on the likelihood of immunity in the U.S. district courts’ commercial activity exception
decisions.
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decisions, the four models presented in Figure 4A mirror the four models
presented in Figure 2, with one exception: we use Judicial Common Space
instead of Decisionmaker’s Party because the former is considered a more
accurate measure of judges’ political ideologies.174
Figure 4A contains mixed evidence of the influence of the legal and political factors over courts’ immunity decisionmaking during the post-FSIA
period. For the legal factors, the variable Corporate Defendant does not
achieve statistical significance in any of the four models. This stands in
contrast to the State Department’s decisions, where the effect of Corporate
Defendant was associated with a statistically significant lower likelihood of
immunity in the two models estimated with the complete data.175 However,
the U.S. Contacts variable is statistically significant and associated with
countries being an estimated 36% less likely to receive immunity in Model 2
and 58% less likely in Model 4.
For the political factors, the variables GDP Per Capita, Democracy, Judicial Common Space, and U.S. Plaintiff all achieve statistical significance in at
least one model. Specifically, there is some evidence, albeit not consistent
evidence, that higher GDP per capita is associated with a higher likelihood
of immunity (Models 3 and 4), the courts are more likely to grant immunity
to democracies than non-democracies (Models 1 and 2), conservative judges
are less likely than liberal judges to grant immunity (Model 2), and judges
are more likely to grant immunity when there is a U.S. plaintiff (Models 2
and 4).176
It is possible that one reason political effects are more apparent in our
analysis of U.S. district court decisions than in our analysis of State Department decisions is that there are more district court decisions in the FSI
Dataset. This makes our analysis of those decisions better able to detect
effects. Additionally, some variables capturing political relationships that
were statistically significant in the bivariate district court results—like U.S.
Ally—are no longer statistically significant after conditioning on the political and legal factors used in the multiple logit analysis. Nevertheless, the
results provide additional evidence of some of the political effects apparent
in the bivariate analysis. This further suggests that, contrary to the FSIA’s

174 This is because after the passage of the FSIA, district court judges made sovereign immunity decisions, and Judicial Common Space is a preferred measure of judicial ideology. See supra
subsection II.B.3.
175 See supra Figure 2, Models 1 & 3. When we replaced Corporate Defendant with Commercial
Activity, the results did not significantly change.
176 CINC Score is also statistically significant in Model 2, but its substantive effect is less than
a 2% change in the likelihood of immunity.
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underlying comparative institutional competence claim, political factors do
significantly influence the judiciary’s immunity decisions.
Figure 4A: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on
Probability of Immunity (Courts, Multivariate Analysis)177
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In Figure 4B, we further explore potential differences between the U.S.
district courts commercial activity exception decisions and their other
immunity decisions. Figure 4B separates the U.S. district court decisions
177 This figure presents multivariate logit estimates of the effects of each indicated legal and
political variable on the likelihood of immunity in the U.S. district courts’ foreign sovereign
immunity decisions, while holding other variables constant at their means.
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into two groups: decisions other than those where the issue was whether the
commercial activity exception applied (Models 1 and 2), and decisions
where the issue was whether the commercial activity exception applied
(Models 3 and 4). As we hypothesized above, with more developed doctrine
to guide judicial decisionmaking, legal factors may be particularly important, and political factors relatively constrained, in commercial activity
decisions compared to other decisions.
Consistent with our expectations and with the bivariate results presented above,178 the legal variables Corporate Defendant, Commercial Activity, and
U.S. Contacts do not have statistically significant effects on the likelihood of
immunity in non-commercial activity exception decisions (Models 1 and 2).
Both U.S. Contacts and Commercial Activity, however, have the expected
negative effects on the likelihood of immunity in commercial activity
exception decisions (Models 3 and 4). Regarding political factors, the results
are mixed. While there is some indication of political effects in noncommercial activity decisions (U.S. Ally has a positive effect in Model 1, and
Judicial Common Space has a negative effect in Models 1 and 2), there are also
political effects in the commercial activity decisions (Democracy has a
positive effect in Models 3 and 4, and GDP Per Capita has a positive effect
in Model 4).

178

See Figures 3B and 3C.
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Figure 4B: Estimated Effects of Legal and Political Factors on
Probability of Immunity (Courts, Multivariate Analysis,
Commercial Activity Exception Decisions and
Other Decisions Compared)179
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179 This figure presents multivariate logit estimates of the effects of each indicated legal and
political variable on the likelihood of immunity in the U.S. district courts’ foreign sovereignimmunity decisions (only decisions other than commercial activity exception decisions in Models 1
and 2, and only commercial-activity-exception decisions in Models 3 and 4), while holding other
variables constant at their means.
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3. Legal and Political Influences on the U.S. District Courts’
Immunity Decisions: Interpreting the Evidence
Together, the bivariate and multivariate analyses provide strong evidence that political factors systematically influence the U.S. District Courts’
foreign sovereign immunity decisions. However, because some of the
political influences evaluated are related to each other and are statistically
significant in some but not all models—for example, GDP Per Capita,
Democracy, and U.S. Ally—it is difficult to specify precisely which factor is
primarily responsible for the apparent influence. Therefore, while our
analysis indicates political influences, we cannot isolate those particular
political influences with confidence. Nevertheless, the basic implication is
that, other things being equal, U.S. district courts are more likely to grant
immunity to wealthy, democratic allies than to other nations.
We can be more confident about the discrete influences of judicial ideology and the plaintiff ’s nationality on the courts’ immunity decisions. The
hypothesis that conservative judges have a more anti–forum shopping and
pro-defendant tilt than liberal judges would suggest that conservative
judges would be more likely to grant immunity.180 But Judicial Common Space
is negative and statistically significant in both Models 1 and 2 of Table 4B,
suggesting that, all else being equal, conservative judges are instead less
likely to grant immunity than liberal judges in non-commercial activity
exception cases. This finding is somewhat puzzling and deserves further
investigation. However, another hypothesis might plausibly explain it:
conservative judges may be less supportive of international law doctrines
like foreign sovereign immunity and less deferential to the interests of
foreign nations than liberal judges.181 The effect of judicial ideology appears
to dissipate in the commercial activity exception cases—perhaps, as we
hypothesize, because the relative doctrinal clarity of that exception constrains judges in a way that leaves less room for ideological influence.
The hypothesis that judges in transnational disputes tend to favor U.S.
parties over foreign parties would suggest that judges are less likely to grant
immunity when there is a U.S. plaintiff.182 But U.S. Plaintiff has a positive
and statistically significant effect in Models 2 and 4 of Table 4A, which uses
the full dataset. The effect is not statistically significant in Models 1 and 2 of
Table 4B, which analyze only noncommercial activity exception cases. But
the effect is again positive and statistically significant in Models 3 and 4 of

180
181
182

See supra subsection II.B.3.
See id.
See id.
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Table 4B, which analyze only commercial activity exception cases. This
suggests that, in cases in which the issue is whether the commercial activity
exception applies, the U.S. district courts are more likely to grant immunity—and thereby deny court access—when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen than
when the plaintiff is a foreign citizen.
Does this suggest a “bias” against U.S. plaintiffs in these cases? Perhaps.
But a more plausible explanation is case selection. Foreign parties are
generally more reluctant than U.S. parties to litigate in U.S. courts due to,
among other things, the costs of litigating far away from home. This
reluctance makes foreign plaintiffs more careful to select only the strongest
claims to bring in U.S. courts.183 If this theory is correct, then U.S. plaintiffs’
arguments against immunity (based, for example, on the commercial
activity exception) are likely to be weaker on the merits, on average, than
those of foreign plaintiffs, thus making U.S. plaintiffs less likely to convince
U.S. judges to deny immunity and allow court access.
In summary, after the FSIA’s transfer of the foreign sovereign immunity
decisionmaking function from the State Department to the courts, there has
not been a simple relationship between law and politics on the one hand,
and foreign sovereign immunity decisions on the other hand. The relationship
is instead complex and contingent. Our findings provide evidence of several
political influences on the U.S. district courts’ immunity decisions. Other
things being equal, the positive effects of GDP Per Capita, Democracy, and
U.S. Ally suggest that the courts are more likely to grant immunity to
wealthy, democratic allies than to other nations. The negative effect of
Judicial Common Space indicates that conservative judges are less likely to
grant immunity than liberal judges. It also appears that nationality matters:
there is evidence that judges are more likely to grant immunity in cases
involving a U.S. plaintiff. However, this is likely due to case selection rather
than bias.
In contrast, there is also evidence that legal factors have an influence. In
particular, two legal factors—Commercial Activity and U.S. Contacts—affect
the courts’ foreign sovereign immunity decisions, at least in commercial
activity exception cases, which is where we would expect those factors to
have an influence. More subtly, it appears that the relative doctrinal clarity
of the commercial activity exception may limit ideological influences, as the
effect of Judicial Common Space is not statistically significant in commercial
activity exception cases.
183 This case selection theory is developed in Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 113334, where the authors explain that foreign litigants “persist in the cases that they are most likely to
win,” causing foreigners to often have a “stronger hand.”
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This evidence suggests that the FSIA’s transfer of foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking from the State Department to the courts has not
realized its promise of depoliticizing these decisions—if these decisions
were systematically politicized in the State Department in the first place. If
the goal was to take politics out of immunity decisionmaking, the FSIA’s
transfer of that function to the courts was at best a partial, but not a complete, success. That in itself is arguably a considerable accomplishment of
the FSIA’s experiment in institutional choice.
C. The FSIA and the Likelihood of Immunity
In addition to the goal of depoliticizing foreign sovereign immunity
decisionmaking, the FSIA was intended to improve court access for suits
against foreign states.184 Has the FSIA accomplished this? Evidence of
systematic differences in the likelihood of immunity in the pre- and postFSIA periods would support the claim that institutional differences matter—a
claim underlying both sides of the comparative institutional competence
debate. Observed differences would also improve understanding of how
institutional differences matter. The absence of such evidence might suggest
a need to reconsider, or at least refine, existing comparative institutional
competence claims.
In this Section, we present our analysis of the effect of the passage of
FSIA on the likelihood of immunity. First, we present the data on the
overall rates of immunity during the two periods. Second, we attempt to
control for factors that may have influenced immunity rates during both
periods (other than the FSIA itself) using multivariate logit analysis.
1. Comparison of Immunity Rates Before and After the FSIA
Beginning with the most straightforward approach, Table 2 presents the
rate at which immunity is granted by the State Department in the pre-FSIA
period and by the U.S. district courts in the post-FSIA period.

184 See Leigh Testimony, supra note 38, at 24, 29 (noting that the general purpose of the FSIA
is “[t]o assure that American citizens are not deprived of normal legal redress against foreign states
who engage in ordinary commercial transactions” and “to facilitate . . . litigation against foreign
states”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 23 (1976) (noting provisions of the FSIA intended to “insure
that private persons have adequate means for commencing a suit against a foreign state to seek
redress in the courts”).
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Table 2: Immunity Rates Before and After FSIA185
Before/After
FSIA

Total
Decisions

Grants of
Immunity

Estimated
Percentage

Before—(State Department)

88

48

After—(District Courts)

381

181

Total

469

229

54.5%
[43.9, 65.2]
46.5%
[42.5, 52.5]
48.8%
[44.3, 53.4]

Although the estimated immunity rate for the State Department
(54.5%) is higher than for the U.S. district courts (47.5%), we have very low
confidence that this represents a systematic difference in immunity rates.186
The 95% confidence intervals for the two estimates substantially overlap,
and the chi-squared statistic does not reach traditionally acceptable levels of
statistical significance.187

185 This table presents estimates of the percentage likelihood of immunity in pre-FSIA State
Department decisions and post-FSIA U.S. district court decisions. Ninety-five percent confidence
intervals for the estimates are in the brackets. The Pearson chi-square value is 1.4176, and the pvalue is 0.234. This table does not include thirty pre-FSIA decisions in which the State Department took no action or the foreign state withdrew its request.
186 Both State Department and district court immunity rates are near 50%, which is consistent with the so-called “50% hypothesis,” according to which litigant case-selection effects can
cause litigation win rates to naturally converge to 50%. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 31-54 (1984) (developing the 50%
hypothesis). However, the 50% hypothesis depends on assumptions about accurate and symmetrical information that are rarely likely to be realistic. See Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff
Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 499-501 (1996) (arguing that the 50% plaintiff
win rate is not a “central tendency, either in theory or in fact”). Nevertheless, to take potential
selection effects into account in our analysis, we also use multivariate analysis below, infra
subsections III.B.2-3, to control for case strength factors that may influence selection of disputes
for litigation. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 137-40 (2002) (noting that interpreting win-rate data in the face of case-selection effects
requires “teas[ing] out residual meaning in [the] data . . . by isolating the remaining implications
of the case-strength factor”).
187 The p-value of 0.234 indicates that, given the characteristics of the population, the probability of obtaining the Pearson chi-squared statistic of 1.4176 solely by chance is 23.4%. See
ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS
IN LAW 252 (2010) (explaining the meaning of the chi-squared statistic). Thus, using either a 5% or
10% level of statistical significance we cannot reject the null hypothesis that immunity rates are not
associated with whether the State Department or the courts make immunity decisions.
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2. Multivariate Analysis: Controlling for Other Potential
Influences on the Likelihood of Immunity
Of course, it is possible that the characteristics of the cases during both
periods were not identical. The raw data do not tell us whether, if an
identical case was filed before and after the FSIA, the likelihood of immunity would be different. Although it is not possible to know the definitive
answer to that hypothetical question, one way to estimate the answer is to
examine the influence of the FSIA on immunity rates while holding legal
and political considerations for the cases constant. To do so, we performed a
series of multivariate logit analyses similar to those presented above. The
results are presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Estimated Effect of Institutional Choice on Likelihood of
Immunity (Multivariate Logit Analysis)188
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The four models presented here mirror those presented in Figures 2 and
4A except in one key respect: we added the variable Post-FSIA, which equals
0 (“No”) if the decision was made by the State Department and 1 (“Yes”) if
188 This figure presents multivariate logit estimates of the effects of each indicated legal and
political variable on the likelihood of immunity in the State Department’s and the U.S. district
courts’ foreign sovereign immunity decisions, while holding other variables constant at their
means.
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the decision was made by a U.S. district court. In all four models, Post-FSIA
is negatively associated with the probability that a country’s request for
foreign sovereign immunity will be granted. However, Post-FSIA only
achieves statistical significance in Model 1.189 The result is thus roughly
comparable to our analysis in the previous section: there does not appear to
be a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of immunity before
and after the FSIA.
D. Assessing the Strength of Our Findings
Throughout this Article, we have used statistical analysis of the FSI Dataset to make findings based on inferences regarding the effects of various
legal and political factors on foreign sovereign immunity decisions. Yet all
statistical inferences entail uncertainty, and it is good practice to report
potential threats to inferences that may result from a particular empirical
research strategy.190 For example, selection bias may occur when the sample
selected for analysis differs systematically from the population about which
inferences are being made.191 The conditions in which such differences can
cause selection bias are narrow.192 Nevertheless, several potential sources of
selection bias deserve mention. First, the State Department Reports might
not include all State Department immunity decisions between 1952 and
1976,193 and the included decisions might differ systematically from State
Department decisions overall. Although the source we use has been previously relied on by academics and we are unaware of any claims that it is
incomplete, it is not possible to confirm that it is complete.
Second, published court decisions are not necessarily representative of
unpublished court decisions. While Lexis—from which we drew our U.S.
district court sample—includes all decisions published in the Federal
189
190

The p-value for Post-FSIA in Model 1 is 0.05.
See Epstein & King, supra note 92, at 49-50 (noting that “[a]ll knowledge and all inference
in research is uncertain” and calling on scholars to estimate the degree of uncertainty associated
with their inferences).
191 See id. at 111 (discussing the circumstances in which selection bias may occur).
192 Specifically, unrepresentativeness of a sample creates selection bias in causal inferences if
(1) a criterion used to select the sample upon which the inferences are based is a cause of the
dependent variable (here, foreign sovereign immunity decisions) and (2) that criterion is also
correlated with an explanatory variable of interest (e.g., whether the foreign state is a democracy).
See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 169-70 (1994) (explaining the circumstances in which an omitted variable can cause biased results).
193 See STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 61, at 1021-22 (“While no assurance can be
given that the list is complete, all diplomatic requests f or immunity which were located have been
included.”).
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Supplement, it does not include all unpublished decisions.194 Therefore,
systematic differences between unpublished and published immunity
decisions might introduce selection bias. To probe the extent of this threat
to inference, we compared decisions published in the Federal Supplement
with unpublished decisions and tested for the effects of publication on the
likelihood of immunity. While there are some differences, they do not alter
our key findings.195
Third, it is possible that suits filed against foreign states after the passage of the FSIA were systematically different than those filed before the
FSIA in ways that may be related to the likelihood of immunity. For
example, plaintiffs’ arguments against immunity or foreign states’ arguments for immunity might have been stronger (or weaker) on the merits
than they were before, or the types of foreign state defendants sued by
plaintiffs might have been more (or less) strongly correlated with political
factors influencing the likelihood of immunity. While the possibility of this
source of bias cannot be eliminated, we mitigate this risk by using multivariate regression in an effort to control for such factors.196 In any event, our
194
195

See supra subsection II.A.2.
In the bivariate logit analyses in Figure 3A, the only significant differences between published and unpublished decisions are as follows: (1) Troop Deployment is not statistically significant
in published decisions, but barely significant in unpublished decisions; (2) GDP Per Capita is
statistically significant in published decisions but not unpublished decisions; and (3) J udicial
Common Space is significant in published but not unpublished decisions. In the multivariate
analyses in Figure 4A, the only significant differences are: (1) in Model 2, Corporate Defendant is
statistically significant in unpublished but not published decisions; (2) in Models 1, 3, and 4, GDP
Per Capita is statistically significant in published but not unpublished decisions; (3) in Models 1
and 2, Democracy is statistically significant in unpublished decisions but not published decisions;
(4) in Model 2, Judicial Common Space is statistically significant in published but not unpublished
decisions; and (5) in Model 2, U.S. Plaintiff is statistically significant in unpublished but not
published decisions. Statistical significance for all of the foregoing comparisons is measured at the
.10 level (p≤.100). This analysis suggests that, insofar as published decisions are disproportionately
influencing our results, our results may be exaggerating the effects of the foreign state’s economic
power and judicial ideology. This analysis also suggests that our results might understate the
effects of the foreign state’s political system, the plaintiff ’s nationality, and of troop deployment.
These results do not affect our basic finding that political factors influence the U.S. district courts’
foreign sovereign immunity decisions, but they do suggest that the nature of those influences may
be different in published and unpublished decisions. In addition, when Federal Supplement is added
to the logit regression models, it has a negative and statistically significant effect in a number of
models. This indicates that immunity is less likely in published decisions than unpublished
decisions, and that insofar as published decisions are disproportionately influencing our results,
our results may be understating the likelihood of immunity in district court decisions. If that is the
case, then it is possible that actual overall immunity rates may have increased after the FSIA’s
transfer of immunity decisionmaking to the courts.
196 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 186, at 137-40 (asserting that interpreting win rate
data in the face of case-selection effects requires “teas[ing] out . . . the remaining implications of
the case-strength factor”).
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motivating research question is not “What were the effects of the passage of
FSIA on litigation?” Instead, it is “What are the systematic differences in
the factors that influenced the State Department and the judiciary when
confronted with a request for immunity?”
Another potential source of bias is omitted variable bias due to legal
change. Specifically, whereas the Tate Letter expressly recognized only the
commercial activity exception,197 the FSIA established other exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity.198 Given this change, there is a risk that we are
comparing apples and oranges. This risk is mitigated by two features of our
analysis. First, we complemented our overall analysis of the U.S. district
courts’ immunity decisions with separate analysis of their commercial
activity exception decisions (see Figures 3C and 4B, supra), which are
arguably more directly comparable to the State Department’s decisions. As
we note above, political influences appear more muted in the separate
analysis—but even then, such influences are more apparent in the district
courts’ decisions than in the State Department’s decisions, which is consistent with our overall results.199 Second, in Section III.C, we control for
the passage of the FSIA and do not find that it significantly changes
immunity rates.
Finally, it is important to note that our results should not be interpreted
as causal analysis. Causal analysis would require some plausible source of
random variation.200 For example, causal analysis would be possible if cases
were randomly assigned to be decided by the State Department or by the
courts. Unfortunately, this is simply not possible. As a result, we have relied
on examining the cases that actually occurred while acknowledging that
there may be systematic differences between the cases filed before and after
the FSIA.
We encourage readers to keep these potential threats to inference in
mind when interpreting our findings. However, in our judgment, they do
not threaten our overall results.

197 See Tate Letter, supra note 59, at 985 (recognizing that “the widespread and increasing
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a
practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts”).
198 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
199 See generally supra Section III.B.
200 See Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies,
7 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 17, 21-22 (2011) (discussing the importance of random assignment for
causal inference).
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IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis has implications not only for foreign sovereign immunity
decisionmaking, but also for broader comparative institutional competence
debates in foreign relations law and beyond. In this Part, we discuss the
implications of our analysis for current debates over institutional competence in foreign official immunity decisionmaking, for more general ongoing debates about how foreign relations law decisionmaking authority
should be allocated between the executive and judicial branch, for the
relationship between doctrinal clarity and impartial judicial decisionmaking,
and for future empirical research on comparative institutional competence.
A. Foreign Official Immunity
Our analysis has implications for the intensifying debate over the proper
allocation of responsibility for a different type of immunity decisionmaking:
foreign official immunity decisionmaking. In its 2010 decision in Samantar v.
Yousuf, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not govern issues
concerning the immunity of individual foreign government officials.201
Instead, such issues are governed by common law.202 However, unlike the
FSIA, which clearly allocates foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking to
the courts, the common law does not clearly allocate foreign official immunity
decisionmaking.203
Since the Supreme Court’s decision, both scholars and the parties in the
Samantar litigation have continued to debate this question. While the U.S.
government argues that the courts should give it absolute deference on
foreign official immunity matters,204 others argue that the courts should
decide these matters.205 And in the Samantar litigation itself, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the degree of deference owed to the

201
202
203

130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286 (2010).
Id. at 2292.
See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 768 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The FSIA displaced the
common law regime for resolving questions of foreign state immunity and shifted the Executive’s
role as primary decision maker to the courts . . . . After Samantar, it is clear that the FSIA did no
such thing with respect to the immunity of individual foreign officials; the common law, not the
FSIA, continues to govern foreign official immunity.”).
204 See id. at 769 (noting that “[t]he United States, participating as amicus curiae, takes the
position that federal courts owe absolute deference to the State Department’s view of whether a
foreign official is entitled to sovereign immunity”).
205 See generally Wuerth, supra note 24 (critiquing the argument that the executive branch
should have authority to make binding foreign official immunity decisions).
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executive depends on the type of foreign official immunity issue presented.206
Our analysis of foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking suggests that
the executive branch may indeed be capable of making legally principled
foreign official immunity decisions in the aftermath of Samantar, independently from systematic political influences.
B. Comparative Institutional Competence and
Foreign Relations Law
More generally, our analysis has implications for continuing debates over
comparative institutional competence in the field of foreign relations law.
While foreign relations law scholars make claims about the comparative
institutional competence of the executive and judicial branches, they
simultaneously lament the difficulty of assessing those claims empirically.207
Although our analysis is only a first step, it sheds preliminary empirical
light on comparative institutional debates in foreign relations law.
For example, our analysis has implications for whether the executive
branch should be trusted to make foreign relations law decisions that are not
systematically political. Arguments for judicial deference to the executive
branch in the area of foreign affairs are both defended and criticized based
on claims about the competence of the courts and the executive branch.208
Our analysis suggests that even if the judiciary has advantages over the
executive branch,209 these advantages do not necessarily include the ability
to depoliticize matters that touch on foreign affairs and transform them into
strictly legal issues. Indeed, under some circumstances, executive branch
agencies may be as capable as courts—sometimes, perhaps, even more
capable—of making decisions based on law, relatively free from political
influences. This is a sobering, although still preliminary, finding for judges,
scholars, and policymakers who might hope to bring the rule of law to bear
on foreign relations matters by vesting decisionmaking authority in the

206 See Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773 (“[W]e give absolute deference to the State Department’s
position on status-based immunity doctrines such as head-of-state immunity. The State Department’s determination regarding conduct-based immunity, by contrast, is not controlling, but it
carries substantial weight in our analysis of the issue.”).
207 See Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 181 (admitting that their institutional competence analysis
is based on “generalizations and assumptions . . . because it is difficult to imagine a sufficiently
rigorous empirical test of these . . . claims”).
208 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
209 See infra Section IV.B.
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courts.210 And it is a potentially encouraging finding for those who argue
that the executive branch is itself capable of making principled legal decisions, even in the politically charged field of foreign relations.211
Our analysis does not necessarily imply that having courts make foreign
sovereign immunity decisions leads to worse consequences than having the
executive branch make the decisions. There may be other reasons for the
judiciary to play a leading role in immunity decisionmaking as well as in
other areas of foreign relations. For example, courts provide disputants with
more expansive due process protections than those ordinarily offered by
executive branch agencies, and the transfer of immunity decisionmaking to
the courts relieved the State Department of a burden that was said to have
complicated its core diplomatic functions.212 But our analysis casts doubt on
a primary justification for delegating these decisions to the judiciary: that
the courts are best equipped to perform these functions in an apolitical
manner.
Moreover, if policymakers did believe that there are compelling reasons
to leave this decisionmaking authority with the courts, our analysis suggests
that centralized decisionmaking authority may incentivize depoliticization.
During the pre-FSIA period, the State Department was able to unilaterally
grant immunity to foreign governments without the decision being overruled
by another branch of government. Despite the fact that this allowed the
State Department to reward allies with impunity, our results suggest that it
did not actually make systematically political decisions. Although further
research would need to be conducted to determine exactly why this is the
case, one plausible theory is that the centralized nature of the decisionmaking during the pre-FSIA period made it easy for private actors and academics to monitor the State Department’s decisions and criticize any examples
that were seen as overly political.213 After the passage of the FSIA, however,
federal district courts across the country ruled on questions of foreign
sovereign immunity. As a result, these decisions were more difficult to closely
monitor, and trends were more difficult to detect. It thus may have been
210 See generally FRANCK, supra note 19 (arguing for independent judicial decisionmaking in
foreign relations matters, without excessive deference to the executive branch, to have those
matters governed by law).
211 See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204-07 (arguing that, because resolutions of
statutory ambiguities in foreign relations cases involve policy, the executive branch is more
institutionally competent than the judiciary to make these resolutions). See generally Curtis A.
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013) (discussing how the President’s legal authority is tempered through
law, not politics, and through historical norms of executive authority).
212 See supra Section I.B.
213 E.g., Leigh, supra note 67.
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easier for decisions incorporating political considerations to go unnoticed
than it previously had been for the State Department.214 If policymakers
were interested in leaving the authority to make foreign sovereign immunity decisions to the courts, but wanted to depoliticize the decisions further, a
potential reform would be to concentrate these cases in one jurisdiction. For
example, cases that have a clear foreign relations law component could be
removed to a single district—perhaps the D.C. district court—in the same
way that many intellectual property cases are appealed directly to the
Federal Circuit.
C. Doctrinal Clarity and Impartiality
Our analysis also reinforces the findings of prior research on the relationship between doctrinal clarity and judicial discretion. As scholars have
demonstrated, legal ambiguity can undermine impartial legal decisionmaking.215
One way of “shoring up impartial justice” is to reduce the ambiguity of the
law.216 The theory behind this proposition is that even if judges are politically partial, they also care about making decisions that are viewed as legally
correct. Therefore, “the degree to which their decisions will be biased will
depend not only on how partial the judges are but also on how clear it is
which decision is ‘right.’”217 For this reason, both legal philosophers and
social scientists have argued that “[c]larity is strongly connected to the rule
of law.”218
Our comparison of commercial activity exception decisions to the
courts’ other foreign sovereign immunity decisions reinforces these findings. The commercial activity exception has been frequently litigated and is
relatively well developed and clear compared to other aspects of the foreign
sovereign immunity doctrine.219 Consistent with the theory that doctrinal
clarity enhances impartiality, we found weaker political influences on the
courts’ commercial activity exception decisions than on their other foreign
214 Of course, it would be reasonable to argue that this is a virtue of the FSIA—after all,
perhaps concerns for foreign relations should be driving foreign sovereign immunity decisions
more than they did prior to the passage of the FSIA.
215 See Eggers & Spirling, supra note 171, at 2-3 (discussing the relationship between ambiguity in legal rules and the impartiality of judges’ decisions).
216 Id. at 2.
217 Id.
218 Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of
U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 1027, 1029 (2011).
219 Cf. Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 170, at 551-52 (suggesting that there is
no need for statutory clarification of the definition of “commercial activity” in the FSIA given the
Supreme Court's clarifications of its meaning).
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sovereign immunity decisions.220 This suggests an important point about
comparative institutional design: absent a sufficiently well-defined legal
framework, an institutional choice may not have its intended consequences.
D. Empirical Research on Comparative Institutional Competence
Finally, our analysis has methodological implications. As discussed
above, our empirical strategy, like any, is imperfect.221 But by presenting our
methodology and assessing potential threats to our inferences, we hope to
stimulate and contribute to scholarly discussions about giving comparative
institutional competence claims the empirical attention they deserve. Even
on this methodological dimension alone, we believe the effort is worthwhile.
As Komesar emphasized:
There are no shortcuts around the issues of institutional choice. Every law
and public policy choice involves institutional choice. That is unavoidable.
The question is whether these institutional choices are made implicitly or
explicitly; whether they are made thoughtfully or haphazardly. In other
words, the issue is the quality of law and public policy analysis.222

We hope this Article encourages further efforts to improve the quality of
comparative institutional analysis, and thus the quality of law and public
policy, in foreign relations law and beyond.
CONCLUSION
The FSIA’s supporters claimed that political factors excessively influenced the State Department’s foreign sovereign immunity decisions.223 The
FSIA aimed to depoliticize immunity decisions by transferring the authority to make those decisions from the executive branch to the courts.224 This
transfer was based on an explicit comparative institutional competence
claim: that the courts would be better than the State Department at making
immunity decisions based on law rather than politics.225 The FSIA also
promised to facilitate court access for claims against foreign states.226

220
221
222
223
224
225
226

See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.D.
KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 11.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.C.
Id.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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How has the FSIA’s experiment fared? There is extensive doctrinal
scholarship on foreign sovereign immunity,227 and experts on U.S. foreign
relations law have concluded that the FSIA has largely accomplished its
goals.228 But we are aware of no prior systematic empirical analysis of the
factors influencing foreign sovereign immunity decisionmaking by either
the State Department or the courts. In this Article, we have used empirical
analysis to examine not only what the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine
says, but also how U.S. institutions apply it to reach real-world outcomes.
Thus, to use Roscoe Pound’s well-known distinction, our analysis complements the traditional “law in the books” focus of the doctrinal scholarship
by providing an analysis of foreign sovereign immunity “in action.”229
Our analysis raises significant doubts about the FSIA’s experiment in
comparative institutional competence. First, we found evidence that the law
of foreign sovereign immunity—in particular, the commercial activity
exception—systematically influenced the State Department’s immunity
decisions; but using a wide variety of indicators, we found hardly any
evidence of systematic political influences on those decisions.230 Second, we
found evidence that political factors—including the foreign state’s economic
power and political system, the judge’s ideology, and the plaintiff ’s nationality—may affect the U.S. district courts’ foreign sovereign immunity decisions.231 Third, we found little evidence that the FSIA has significantly
enhanced court access by reducing the likelihood of immunity in particular
cases.232 Overall, these findings significantly challenge the basis for the comparative institutional competence claims that motivated the FSIA, and suggest
that the FSIA’s experiment in institutional choice may not have been as

227 For a comprehensive doctrinal treatment of foreign sovereign immunity, see JOSEPH W.
DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2003).
228 See FRANCK, supra note 19, at 105 (claiming that the FSIA succeeded in depoliticizing
foreign sovereign immunity decisions); Wuerth, supra note 24, at 952 (noting problems associated
with State Department immunity decisionmaking and concluding that “[r]eturning immunity to
the courts resolved these problems”).
229 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) (distinguishing between “law in the books” and “law in action”). This Article thus joins prior scholarship
that takes an empirical approach to decisionmaking in transnational law. E.g., Tonya L. Putnam,
Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT’L
ORG. 459 (2009) (providing an empirical analysis of extraterritorial application of domestic law);
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011)
(employing empirical analysis of forum non conveniens decisionmaking); Whytock, supra note 93
(presenting an empirical analysis of international choice-of-law decisionmaking).
230 See supra Section III.A.
231 See supra Section III.B.
232 See supra Section III.C.
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successful—or perhaps may not have been as necessary—as commonly
assumed.
Beyond foreign sovereign immunity, our findings provide preliminary
evidence suggesting that the executive branch may be more competent at
making foreign relations law decisions than conventional wisdom suggests,
and that judicialization cannot necessarily immunize foreign relations
decisions from politics. As we have emphasized, there are many criteria to
take into account when evaluating which institutions are best suited to
perform particular foreign relations functions—but competence to make
decisions based on law rather than politics has been a central criterion in
debates over comparative institutional competence, including in the foreign
relations field. Our analysis shows that this criterion deserves reconsideration, or at least closer scrutiny, as these debates continue.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Appendix A1: Pre-FSIA Summary Statistics
Variable
Decision
Corporate Defendant
Commercial Activity
U.S. Contacts
U.S. Ally
Diplomatic Representation
Troop Deployment
UNSC Member
Borders Communist
Communist State
GDP Per Capita
U.S. Exports
OECD Member
CINC Score
Democracy
Decisionmaker’s Party
U.S. Plaintiff

Mean
0.55
0.18
0.48
0.60
0.95
0.94
0.14
0.17
0.25
5504
1287
0.10
0.01
0.20
0.47
0.86

SD
0.50
0.39
0.50
0.49
0.21
0.23
0.35
0.38
0.44
5167
4482
0.30
0.03
0.41
0.50
0.35

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
303
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
21,251
28,740
1
0.17
1
1
1
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Appendix A2: Post-FSIA Summary Statistics
Variable
Decision
Corporate Defendant
Commercial Activity
U.S. Contacts
U.S. Ally
Diplomatic Representation
Troop Deployment
UNSC Member
Borders Communist
Communist State
GDP Per Capita
U.S. Exports
OECD Member
CINC Score
Democracy
Decisionmaker’s Party
U.S. Plaintiff

Mean
0.48
0.32
0.55
0.61
0.44
0.84
0.85
0.19
0.21
0.12
12,791
8864
0.24
0.02
0.48
0.53
0.78

SD
0.50
0.47
0.50
0.49
0.50
0.37
0.36
0.39
0.41
0.33
10,784
21,221
0.43
0.03
0.50
0.50
0.41

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
257
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
51,449
176,258
1
0.20
1
1
1
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APPENDIX B: TRADITIONAL REGRESSION TABLES
Appendix B1: Regression Results for Figure 2

Corporate Defendant

(1)
-1.71**
(0.69)

U.S. Contacts
U.S. Ally
UNSC Member

-0.82
(0.54)
-1.29
(1.02)

(2)
-2.13
(1.36)
0.38
(0.94)
-0.73
(1.17)
-4.96
(37.06)

0.08
(0.56)
88

(4)
-2.36
(1.53)
0.57
(1.01)
-1.04
(1.29)
-4.33
(41.48)
0.51
(1.32)
1.37
(1.11)
0.00
(0.00)
62.61
(130.67)
0.20
(1.68)
-1.11
(0.98)
-1.58
(1.94)
0.95
(1.73)
38

58.60

121.92

60.93

10.70

-20.96

17.54

Borders Communist
Communist State

N

0.29
(0.50)
88

0.00
(0.00)
74.04
(130.96)
-0.05
(1.67)
-1.14
(0.85)
-1.84
(1.96)
1.79
(1.68)
38

AIC

121.42

Log L

-28.71

GDP Per Capita
CINC Score
Democracy
Decisionmaker’s Party

0.00**
(0.00)
21.74
(19.14)
-0.91
(0.76)
-0.08
(0.49)

U.S. Plaintiff
Intercept

(3)
-1.98***
(0.75)

-0.89
(0.56)
-1.27
(1.11)
-0.36
(0.74)
1.06
(0.66)
0.00*
(0.00)
23.57
(25.43)
-0.59
(0.82)
0.15
(0.51)

Asterisks denote statistical significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Appendix B2: Regression Results for Figure 4A

Corporate Defendant

(1)
-0.07
(0.25)

U.S. Contacts
U.S. Ally
UNSC Member

0.26
(0.28)
0.21
(0.35)

(2)
-0.22
(0.27)
-1.52***
(0.27)
0.28
(0.30)
0.14
(0.37)

-0.79
(0.58)
96

(4)
-0.94
(0.59)
-2.84***
(0.65)
-0.06
(0.80)
0.13
(0.88)
0.50
(0.84)
-1.61
(1.35)
0.00**
(0.00)
7.69
(13.31)
-0.37
(0.65)
-1.12
(0.84)
1.67**
(0.75)
-0.44
(0.87)
94

433.01

138.78

114.14

-176.50

-29.39

-9.07

Borders Communist
Communist State

N

-0.80***
(0.21)
348

0.00
(0.00)
7.23*
(4.22)
0.78**
(0.31)
-0.67**
(0.34)
0.71**
(0.31)
-0.39
(0.31)
343

AIC

468.90

Log L

-202.45

GDP Per Capita
CINC Score
Democracy
Judicial Common Space

0.00
(0.00)
6.38
(3.97)
0.78***
(0.29)
-0.46
(0.31)

U.S. Plaintiff
Intercept

(3)
-0.61
(0.49)

-0.08
(0.66)
-0.31
(0.77)
0.53
(0.66)
-1.59
(1.18)
0.00***
(0.00)
14.73
(10.92)
-0.21
(0.55)
0.99
(0.72)

Asterisks denote statistical significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Appendix B3: Regression Results for Figure 4B

Corporate Defendant

(1)
-0.28
(0.48)

(2)

(3)
-0.56
(0.36)

(4)

N

-0.41
(0.44)
0.84*
(0.48)
0.42
(0.66)
0.00
(0.00)
8.10
(9.65)
0.25
(0.53)
-0.82*
(0.50)
-0.28
(0.53)
-0.63
(0.45)
139

0.50
(0.45)
-0.53
(0.46)
0.67
(0.49)
0.41
(0.66)
0.00
(0.00)
9.82
(10.32)
0.14
(0.53)
-0.88*
(0.51)
-0.11
(0.55)
-0.93*
(0.50)
139

-2.28***
(0.40)
-0.15
(0.41)
-0.10
(0.48)
0.00
(0.00)
8.32
(5.15)
0.95**
(0.42)
-0.33
(0.51)
1.26***
(0.43)
0.01
(0.47)
204

-1.39***
(0.40)
-2.35***
(0.41)
-0.15
(0.43)
-0.10
(0.49)
0.00
(0.00)
5.15
(5.15)
1.10**
(0.45)
-0.64
(0.54)
1.21***
(0.43)
0.97*
(0.57)
204

AIC

187.46

186.56

246.77

236.06

Log L

-53.73

-53.38

-83.38

-78.03

Commercial Activity
U.S. Contacts
U.S. Ally
UNSC Member
GDP Per Capita
CINC Score
Democracy
Judicial Common Space
U.S. Plaintiff
Intercept

Asterisks denote statistical significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Appendix B4: Regression Results for Figure 5

Post-FSIA
Corporate Defendant

(1)
-0.56**
(0.27)
-0.24
(0.22)

U.S. Contacts
U.S. Ally
UNSC Member

0.12
(0.24)
0.06
(0.31)

(2)
-0.46
(0.39)
-0.30
(0.25)
-1.30***
(0.25)
0.09
(0.27)
0.16
(0.35)

-0.11
(0.41)
184

(4)
-0.53
(0.49)
-0.92*
(0.47)
-1.77***
(0.46)
-0.49
(0.51)
-0.17
(0.82)
0.39
(0.57)
-0.30
(0.70)
0.00***
(0.00)
8.06
(9.28)
0.37
(0.51)
-0.60
(0.43)
0.91
(0.60)
0.42
(0.75)
132

501.66

257.06

174.53

-206.83

-84.53

-35.26

Borders Communist
Communist State

N

-0.16
(0.28)
445

0.00
(0.00)
8.10**
(3.96)
1.00***
(0.28)
-0.26
(0.22)
0.58**
(0.29)
0.19
(0.46)
390

AIC

603.39

Log L

-265.70

GDP Per Capita
CINC Score
Democracy
Decisionmaker’s Party

0.00
(0.00)
8.11**
(3.65)
0.80***
(0.25)
-0.03
(0.20)

U.S. Plaintiff
Intercept

(3)
-0.46
(0.36)
-0.77**
(0.36)

-0.30
(0.37)
-0.58
(0.58)
0.23
(0.44)
0.18
(0.48)
0.00***
(0.00)
8.62
(7.16)
-0.05
(0.42)
-0.09
(0.33)

Asterisks denote statistical significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

